The Communists

It is not easy to talk about the Communist movement in Greece. It never has been. The reasons lie in the fact that no political movement in Greece this century has shown such endurance and resilience nor witnessed such dramatic changes in its fortunes as the Communists. The heroic period of the Resistance against foreign occupation during the Second World War and the ensuing Civil War after the liberation (1846-49) has inexorably marked the post-war development of the Communist movement. Outlawed in 1947, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) re-emerged only in 1974, after the collapse of the Colonels’ military junta. Still the party’s leadership and professional structures continue to be dominated by an ageing generation whose entire political culture and practices are imbued by the experiences and ideas of the ‘40s. Moreover, the KKE’s persistent subservience towards the Soviet Union, which quite often takes extreme and incredible forms, is reminiscent of inter-war Communists, when all West European Communist Parties affiliated to the Third International had willy-nilly to toe the line emanating from .Moscow. However, Communist orthodoxy is deeply rooted in the Greek soil and attracts genuine popular support. The Communist movement in Greece represents a political tradition very tightly interwoven with the country’s modern political {development. Taken in its European context this tradition is perhaps unique in the sense that in the absence of any serious socialist or social-democratic tradition or even a strong and autonomous labour movement, the left of the political spectrum in Greece has always been dominated by the Communists.

The split of the KKE in 1968 has done little to shake up Communist orthodoxy. The splinter dissident group of Communists, who later formed the KKE-interior, moved gradually to Euro-communist positions but failed to redress the balance within the Communist movement to their favour, as they had hoped. Today, whereas Communist orthodoxy shows signs of stagnation and decline but no real challenge or dissent from within, the regrouping of the Euro-communist and non-communist Left has somehow become a major issue in Greek politics, for it can potentially reshuffle to a considerable degree the cards within the Left, including the ruling PASOK.

The purpose here is not to review all the aspects of the Communist movement in Greece.

Rather, it is to describe the historical background influences of the movement’s predicament today and to summarise the major changes over the past two decades or so. The inter-Communist conflict is examined in some detail in order to make clear the issues involved and assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two rival camps.

The programmes, ideologies and policies of both Communist parties are subsequently summarily presented and discussed. Finally, future prospects for both parties are considered in order to assess not only their inter-relationships but more importantly their potential impact on Greek politics.

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

From its very inception1 the KKE promised to bring about a revolution, yet has never been able to carry out its pledge. During the quasi-fascist dictatorship of General Metaxas from 1936 to 1940, the party was brutally repressed yet rapidly recovered to emerge as the leading force behind the Greek wartime resistance movement, the most powerful and widely supported in Europe. Nonetheless, when liberation came in 1944 its hopes of making a ‘new Greece’ were quickly frustrated.

The KKE leadership’s first attempt to seize power by armed force in Athens in December 1944 was ruthlessly put down by direct British military intervention. The British had chosen and prepared the ground for confrontation with care and skill, having previously secured a free hand in managing Greek affairs by the well-known agreement they concluded with Stalin to carve-up the Balkans into spheres of influence.

The Communist-led Resistance movement was defeated, disarmed and humiliated. It was the beginning of the end for the Communist movement too. KK£ policies at the time were confused, contradictory and hesitant. No clear course of action was pursued with either determination or consistency. The leadership, apparently, was caught on the horns of an uncomfortable dilemma: whether to accept a subordinate role in the post-war social and political order no matter the price or to opt resolutely for all-out armed struggle to seize power. By its nature, the party was unwilling and ill-prepared to make the first choice, which in any case would have entailed gradual and painful incorporation into the system. The second option, which finally prevailed, was chosen at the wrong moment and in the face of overwhelming odds. In the end, in contrast to their Italian counterparts, the Greek Communists got the worst of both worlds.

In the second round of Communist insurgency, which rapidly developed into full-scale Civil War (1946-49), it was obvious that the dice were heavily loaded against the Left. The party was outlawed in 1947 and the Communists, now militarily outnumbered and politically isolated, suffered a devastating defeat, from which they were never to recover. It was a desperate and heroic struggle for a lost cause. Needless to say, their defeat was achieved only with massive military and economic assistance from the USA, who in the wake of the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine (March 1947) stepped smartly in to take over British ‘responsibilities’ and secure Greece for the West.

Lost causes usually generate passionate and bitter controversy as the blame must be apportioned, heroes celebrated, the dead mourned and worshipped, and motives vindicated. It must be said, however, that the primary reason for the Communists’ defeat lies unmistakably in their eagerness to anticipate and act in accordance with Soviet interests. There is nothing extraordinary in this stance nor does it mean that Communists were ‘traitors’ or ‘spies’. It was unthinkable at the time for a genuine CP to perceive its mission in any other way. Loyalty to the Soviet Union, the ‘motherland of socialism’, was an article of faith, the yardstick against which ‘true revolutionary’ action should be measured. The Greek Communists were used as pawns in a chess-game whose rules they willingly accepted. After all, they had always solicited ‘fraternal·’ (foreign) intervention to settle their internal disputes and crises.2 They saw themselves as an integral part of a wider international movement with a historical mission to fulfil, a movement whose forward march was pre-destined by the ‘iron laws of history’ and ‘historical necessity’. It happens that Catholics are often more Catholic than the Pope himself: absolute dependence and blind subordination to the ‘higher good’ even made the KKE compromise its stance on national issues,3 which later resulted in many Communists facing the firing squad as traitors to their country.

This is not to equate the executioner and the victim, but this relationship of dependence lies at the heart of all the Communists’ defeats. Its basic core and the mentality which derives from it still remain, and have acquired totemic importance. The great Myth which is sustained for reasons both of psychological security and political expediency, constitutes the major obstacle to reform. Fear of excommunication and ostracism keeps internal conflicts and contradictions from breaking out of the orthodox shell. At least for that generation of Greek Communists, it is safer and much more convenient to live with the Myth than to open the door to doubt. It is very hard to come to terms with reality when a whole life has been sacrificed to the cause. The syndrome of the lost paradise settles in for good and the psychological mechanism of rejection and denial of any doubt is set in motion for reasons of elementary self-defence. Without it, the totality of the Greek Communist identity would be threatened with disintegration. Truth is hard to bear, for it is inherently destructive and likely to disturb the delicate balance between existence and meaning, in political as well as psychological terms.

FROM CIVIL WAR TO MILITARY DICTATORSHIP; 1949-1967

After the Civil War, in the newly emerged state institutional balance between Army, Monarchy and Parliament, the Army secured its predominance (Mouzelis, 1978[a] & 1986) by virtue of its role as victor and its substantial ideological and material resources based on US assistance and support (Kapetanyannis, 1986). A security state was created whose main features were the growth of security services and paramilitary organisations under the control of the military, a dual legality inscribed in and parallel to the constitutional order, a restricted range of political rights and liberties (Alivizatos, 1979), categorisation of citizens according to discriminatory political and ideological criteria, the identification of external and internal enemies, the politics of exclusion by legal, administrative and police methods and an official ideology of rampant anti-communism, subversion and national security.

By these means conservative stability and rule (Tsoukalas, 1969) were established and lasted well into the early ‘60s. Political life was effectively polarised between Right and Left, with the latter’s supporters as the pariahs of the system – leaving a vacuum in the centre, where any occasional occupiers were usually regarded with suspicion by both sides.

In this order too, the fragments of the Left had to find a space to survive. The KKE had virtually ceased to exist inside the country. Its leaders, as well as most of the remnants of the guerrilla army, had taken refuge in East European countries. However, as early as 1951, a new party, the United Democratic Left (EDA), was founded. Initially conceived as a coalition party, an electoral device to rally the scattered Left, EDA was soon to develop into a unified and well organised political party4 with a substantial popular following and a very respectable electoral record (see Table 1). It even became, for a short period (1958-61), the main opposition party in Parliament.

By the early 1960s, the EDA had clearly identified organisational structures, ideological principles and a political programme5 and had increased its membership to nearly 70,000 with a network of around 250 party offices throughout the country. Its own press consisted of two national dailies, 6 a monthly theoretical review 7, a publishing house, and numerous other publications. Its youth organisation in particular played a leading role in the great student mobilisations of the early ’60s8, struggles which precipitated the far greater nationwide political mobilisations which Georgios Papandreou, leader of the Centre Union (EK) party called his ‘unrelenting struggle’. Eventually, Georgios Papandreou succeeded in breaking the right-wing stronghold in the two successive electoral confrontations of November 1963 and February 1964 (Papandreou Andreas, 1973) and forming a majority government.

In these mobilisations too, EDA played a major organisational and political rple. And when later Georgios Papandreou’s government was toppled (1965) by royal intervention, it was again EDA’s Lambrakis Youth Organisation (Martin, St. C, 1984) which led the fight against the establishment.9

Significantly enough, it was during the same period (1965-67) that a new left-wing radical political movement emerged under the aegis and charismatic leadership of Andreas Papandreou.

During the 1960’s, Greece experienced unprecedented economic and social change. But soon the consequences of a highly uneven capitalist development started to rebound on the repressive regime. Expectations were rising, social problems accumulating, new social and political forces were entering the political arena which the system could not accommodate without opening up itself. EDA, however, failed to reap any political benefits. Certainly, under the wise counsel of its elderly chairman, Ioannis Passalides, and the leader of its parliamentary group, Elias Eliou, the party was gradually moving towards integration into national politics and was increasingly led to value democratic procedures and parliamentary politics. Its domestic politics, however, remained maximalist and ambivalent and its tactics, particularly at crucial political conjunctures, lamentable. On foreign policy issues too, EDA was strongly pro-Soviet, anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-EEC and advocated neutrality.

The reason for EDA’s failure lies fundamentally in the fact that the Communist element within it had eventually become dominant, controlling all levels of party organisation and important-policy making bodies. The policies and resolutions of the KKE’s leadership in exile were passed for implementation to a group of Communist leaders inside EDA called the ‘Interior Office’. Other Communist factions existed too. EDA had often come under fire from the KKE for delaying the final assault on the Greek ‘Winter Palace’. With the gradual opening of Greek society to outside influences, the Left was also exposed to Western Marxism and intellectual dissent and criticism were soon hesitantly to appear. Crucial disagreements between the ‘Interior’ and ‘Exterior’ KKE leaders 150 over organisational policies and electoral tactics grew into major disputes.10

Moreover, EDA was in effect assigned the modest (sic) task of realizing its programmatic goal of ‘National Democratic Change* (Meynaud, 1965), a euphemism for nothing less than an ‘anti-imperialist, anti-monopolist revolution’.

Once this had been accomplished the KKE would step in to implement its ‘maximum’ programme of ‘socialism’ based on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the like.

These peculiarities of EDA as a party made it a quite distinct and unique political formation, not only in the Greek context, where personalistic and clientelistic political parties dominated political structures (Legg, 1969 and Mouzelis, 1978[c]), but also in the context of the West European Left historically split into Socialist and Communist Parties. Not surprisingly, it was during this period that the seeds of a Communist schism were sown (Kapetanyannis, 1979).

THE SPLIT – 1968

Despite the visible strains on Greece’s fragile parliamentary system during a period of deepening political crisis, intense mobilisation and institutional decay (1965-67), both KKE and EDA completely misread the omens and failed to anticipate politically the very real danger of a dictatorial solution. As a result, the military coup d’état of April 1967 administered a particularly severe blow to the Left, for it destroyed overnight what had painfully been constructed during the post-Civil War era. Of course, the causes of the military takeover are complex (Mouzelis, 1976, Kapetanyannis, 1986) and cannot be simply reduced to the failures of the Left, Communist and non-Communist alike. The responsibilities of all political forces during the pre-1967 coup period have not yet been fully investigated and it is still customary for important issues to be swept conveniently under the carpet. The role of the military in Greek politics was so predominant (Couloumbis, 1971, Stavrou, 1977, Danopoulos, 1984, Mouzelis, 1986, Kapetanyannis, 1986) that it could only be ignored at very great risk. Breaking the post-Civil War power structure11– was not as easy as the Left was inclined to believe.

Needless to say, Communists and left-wingers formed the greater part of the population of the concentration camps and prisons to which the military junta confined its opponents. The dictatorship was also instrumental in further undermining KKE’s precarious unity. The causes of this new defeat and the policy to be followed under these new conditions became the object of bitter recrimination between the main factions within the party. The break occurred in February 1968 when the dissident ‘Interior’ faction and its supporters in the top party echelons were forced to make a choice between expulsion and submission12. The issue was decided when General Secretary Kostas Koliyannis was able to produce evidence for explicit Soviet support of his faction.

The split at the top deeply divided Communist militants in Greece and abroad and seriously affected the organised Resistance against the Colonels. The bitterness was compounded by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the supression of the ‘Prague Spring’, which forced the two factions further apart as party members and supporters were called upon to take sides. The expelled dissident faction, later called KKE- interior, and its militant Youth Organisation13, played a prominent role in the Resistance movement throughout the period of the dictatorship (1967-74), which, deprived of any real legitimacy or mass political base, was constantly struggling to maintain itself by repression (Clogg, 1972, Veremis, 1985 and Woodhouse, 1985). The orthodox KKE and its Youth Organisation14 made their political presence felt later on, particularly during the last two years before the fall of the junta (1974).

At the beginning, the reasons for the split in the top echelons of the party were not absolutely clear to the rank and file. Nevertheless, the underlying causes are again to be identified mainly with the Stalinist and dependent nature of the party. The movement’s successive political defeats exacerbated divisions on essential questions of domestic (not least the internal functioning of the party) and, later, foreign policy. Worse, a long tradition of authoritarianism, anti-intellectualism, crude empiricism, labourism, moralising and lack of political ethos were responsible for the fact that a whole series of party leaders were discredited and dishonoured by their successors, usually in order to justify a new party line.

The dictatorship was a catalyst for the Communist movement in many important ways. In the first place, the schism between the orthodox KKE under Harilaos Florakis15 and the KKE-interior under Babis Drakopoulos16 was consolidated and crystallised into separate clandestine organisations operating inside Greece. Secondly, dissident Communists were for the first time drawn into close contact with non-Communist political forces in cooperating to bringing about the downfall of the regime. And, lastly, an increasingly radical movement, especially among the Youth, began to look to the Left for inspiration and practical solutions. The dynamic of these currents was soon to be felt on the collapse of the military regime in 1974.

REBIRTH – 1974 AND AFTER

Settling accounts

With the downfall of the military regime and the transition to parliamentary democracy (Diamandouros, 1984) Greece entered a new and unprecedented phase of liberalisation. The Communists, now legalised after being banished from the political scene since 1947, acquired equal political status in national politics. At the same time internal differences burst into the open and battle was waged between the two divergent camps to win over the hearts and minds of Communist supporters. However, seriously weakened under the dictatorship and caught off guard by the pace of events, the two Communist parties (KKE and KKE- interior) together with the remnants of EDA hastily concluded an electoral alliance, euphemistically called the ‘United Left’, to fight the 1974 General Election, in which they polled 9.47% of the vote. Voting analysis suggested that the KKE outnumbered the two other parties17 of the coalition by nearly 2 to 1.

The period between 1974 and 1977, when the next parliamentary elections were held, can be seen as decisive in settling accounts between the two CPs. The result of the 1977 election indicated that Communist voters clearly preferred the pro-Moscow KKE and rejected Eurocommunist renovation. With 9.35% of the vote the KKE elected 11 MPs and won back the great majority of the pre-1967 Communist voters to the flock. On the other hand, the KKE-interior, fighting the election in alliance with four other small political groupings, scored a poor 2.7% of the vote and elected 2 MPs. This electoral defeat marked a turning point for the Eurocommunists who, for all practical purposes, were politically marginalised. The factors contributing to the KKE-interior’s defeat seem to be complex and still constitute a matter of serious dispute within its own ranks18. It is clear, however, that during that crucial period the KKE, with the backing of the Soviet Union19 and the international Communist movement ‘as the only Marxist-Leninist party’ in Greece, and mobilising its immense economic resources, had set itself the right targets: to build up a solid organisation and hegemonize the Communist constituency by crushing its rivals by any means and at any cost. Its emotional appeal to the Communist political- cultural tradition of heroism and sacrifice, class solidarity, party loyalty, symbolic values and nostalgia for the grand old cause paid off. Its uncompromising stance against the post-junta conservative order, and its frenetic anti-NATO, anti-EEC and ‘anti-monopoly, anti-imperialist’ rhetoric were in tune with the mood of left-wing supporters, particularly the young.

The KKE-interior on the other hand, deficient both in organisation and resources, hesitant and with no clear-cut political identity preached moderation and consensus, appealed to the nation20 rather than to a limited class constituency, and argued its case on a rational rather than emotional basis. This stance together with its pro-EEC policies exposed the party to false accusations of having become ‘a bourgeois, social-democratic party’ at best, such was the prevailing mood of the time. Moreover, the party’s eleventh hour electoral alliance resulted in a flawed campaign, not communist enough to attract traditionalists and fundamentalists and not liberal enough to lure the non-communist vote. Consequently, it fell disastrously between two stools (Mouzelis, 1978[b] Penniman, 1981) and its hopes for a major breakthrough were irreversibly dashed, shaking the party to its foundations21.

Broadly speaking, both CPs failed to make any political capital out of the rapid radicalisation of large urban and rural sections of the population. It was the newly founded PASOK (1974) under Andreas Papandreou which reaped the political benefits. Its meteoric electoral rise in 1977 was followed by a sweeping victory in the October 1981 national elections (Clogg, 1981, Catephores, 1981, Featherstone, 1982). Many disillusioned old- timers deserted both the CPs and opted for the more realistic choice of voting for PASOK and thus terminating an almost uninterrupted conservative rule of forty years. In the same elections, the KKE won 10.93% of the vote and 13 seats, whereas the KKE-interior fared badly with 1.34% and no seats at all. The latter’s 5.3% score at the Euro-elections, held simultaneously, was a small consolation. PASOK1s victory shattered the myth that, given the absence of any significant socialist tradition and movement in Greece and the total domination of the socialist political space and policies by Communists, it was impossible for such a movement to emerge, let alone win power.

ORGANISATION AND POWER

Soon after their legalisation in 1974 both CPs sought to regroup and organise their scattered forces. Starting with the KKE, it is worth noting that in the space of a few years it developed into a formidable party machine with great capabilities of political and electoral mobilisation. Party offices and cell organisations are now spread over every corner of the country. Membership has increased rapidly to tens of thousands22, whereas professional party cadres are counted in thousands rather than in hundreds. Sociologically, party membership is drawn mainly from the working classes (broadly defined), although urban middle and lower middle strata are well represented23.

Such a large organisation has naturally a substantial capability of recruiting new blood and replacing membership losses. Lavish expenditure during electoral campaigns (National, European and Local) indicate an abundance of financial resources. The party’s publishing and printing company figures among the 15 largest in the sector24. A number of other publishing houses, assumed to be directly or indirectly controlled by the KKE, its press25 and numerous specialised publications constitute a well-oiled ideological and propaganda machinery. In addition, the party’s political activities, inside and outside Parliament, receive more than fair coverage by the ‘bourgeois’ media. A modern multi-storey block of offices (The People’s house), which cost millions of pounds to build, accommodates the central party bureaucracy.

This enormous party apparatus with a great concentration of resources, decision-making and leadership function wields, through a vast network of controlled mass organisations, considerable political influence in all sectors of civil society. Its strongholds are trade26 and students27 unions and local authorities28 but the party’s presence is also strongly felt in the professional organisations29 of the urban middle and lower middle classes, the art world and, to a far lesser extent, in the Civil Service and the various organisations of the peasantry.

This influence is generated and supported by a strictly disciplined, indoctrinated and authoritarian organisation, as exemplified in the militancy of its Youth Organisation, KNE, which often resorts to violent and thuggish behaviour against its rivals. A constitution of 60 articles30 stresses, in its preamble, monolithicity as a virtue and binding rule, whereas other clauses refer to ‘rigorous party discipline’ (art.1), ‘Marxism-Leninism’ (art.56), ‘proletarian internationalism’ (art.57) and ‘democratic centralism’ (art.11).

The KKE-interior on the other hand is a much looser and more tolerant organisation. Discussions are free – there are no ‘unanimous’ decisions any more – and there is a statutory31 obligation to publish minority opinions, which has been standard practice in recent years. Respect for democratic values and procedures, party and media pluralism and the ‘democratic road to Greek socialism’ by popular voting consensus constitute fundamental party principles, which are basically adhered to in political practice. Membership, however, has remained nearly stagnant32 at a low level over the years, though voting patterns suggest that the party has managed to establish itself on a small scale throughout the country. Consequently, its political influence in the country as a whole is really marginal and, despite the party’s efforts, it has failed to win any substantial base in the industrial working class. Its press33 too, although of good journalistic standards and relatively high quality, has been restricted to very low circulation figures for years. It is also characteristic that both parties support separate ‘peace movements’, which differ considerably in their approach to the superpowers and disarmament34.

Finally, in electoral terms, it is interesting to note among others that the influence of the older generations in the inter-communist conflict is considerable as shown in the fact that KKE scores its national average in the over-45 age group, whereas KKE-interior’s influence there is negligible33.

PROGRAMMES, IDEOLOGIES, AND POLICIES

Lost causes, especially those that foster lasting loyalties and nostalgic memories, are among the most prolific breeders of political illusions, which in turn feed the hope that the cause might be in some measure retrievable. The KKE programme36 has all the ingredients to make it a relic of the past, a highly improbable project whose realisation would turn Greece into a Soviet-type one-party state. Its undemocratic and totalitarian features co-exist peacefully with all the chimeras of communist tradition. This model of society, to be achieved by violent means, if necessary37 – and given the opportunity – is pursued by rigid ‘class politics’ domestically and ‘two-camp’ attitudes on foreign affairs. This twin-track mentality informs policies and dictates positions on crucial national issues. For instance, the party’s economic programme, promising an idyllic and prosperous society for all, if implemented would mathematically lead to a siege and command economy and ultimately to a one-party state. On foreign issues, there is a total identification with the Soviet Union’s views and policies. Even on the case of the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, KKE felt obliged to toe the Soviet line with excessive and absurd demonstrations of loyalty. Certainly, sometimes, the KKE shows tactical flexibility and puts forward proposals and mini-programmes for immediate action and realisation. But it is the hidden agenda which undermines credibility and arouses hostile scepticism and doubt in the overwhelming majority of the Greek people.

Yet the party enjoys genuine popular support. With its strong traditional identity, full of heroism and suffering as well as a history of violent acts, self-inflicted wounds and tragic self-vilification, it has the ability to put its rich resources to effective use, to enthuse its supporters and translate its orthodoxy into practical ideologies. Like a religious order, infallibility is a declared dogma; ‘false’ ideas must be purged by party inquisition and political heresy is seen as a corruption of both the Faith and its believers. The party’s tradition and culture requires militants to remain in a state of perpetual alert and hyper-activity, for the stakes are always high. This fortress mentality and self-styled vanguardism constitute a real subculture, a sort of ideological ‘ghetto’ – with its extreme forms of moral tyranny and censorship – in which the faithful repress their doubts and reaffirm their self-deception, no matter what happens outside, in a state of perpetual readiness for the moment of the proclaimed ‘decisive confrontation’.

Against this ossified logic and traditional Communist values, Eurocommunist ideas, as pioneered by the KKE-interior long before the term was coined, can be seen to a certain extent not only as a drastic antidote, but also as a drive towards the secularisation of Communist political thought. The party’s lengthy programme38 is however a mixture of old orthodoxy, platitudes and fresh ideas to deal with socialist change seen as a process of ‘structural transformation,’ leading to a ‘rupture’ with capitalism (the ‘third road’ avoiding the pitfalls of both Stalinism and social democracy). This gradualist approach is supported by declarations of pluralism, the strengthening of civil society associations and institutions, and support for ‘movement politics’ (e.g. feminist, Green etc.). Its political practice, however, does not always live up to these principles. Ideologically, the party does not have many fixed points of reference, despite claims to the opposite in official texts. Its political culture is fairly westernised. It is not possible to enforce any gospel. Policies consequently flow from the twin sources of ideology and realism and the party’s approach shows a distinct consensual rather than confrontational style in most cases. There is also a clear European dimension to its policies with a strong pro-EEC approach close to that adopted by the Italian CP and a quasi-European socialist perspective. On foreign policy issues, the party again closely follows its Italian comrades. Unlike its rival KKE, nationalism plays a far more important role in shaping policies on foreign policy issues. Nationalism here signifies not only independence from Moscow and a practice to put the perceived interests of the Greek labour movement first, but also a move to incorporate into policies non-class elements of analysis.

In conclusion, given its limited electoral appeal, the KKE-interior is still a cultural, moral and intellectual force rather than a party with real political muscle in Greek society. Perhaps they are prophets without honour at home, as THE TIMES once put it39.

Future Prospects: Who is the Left?

In the European elections of June 1984 both KKE and KKE-interior did rather well by winning 12.5% and 3.4% of the vote respectively, a performance which, had it been repeated in the June 1985 General Election, would have brought the ruling PASOK party very close to losing its absolute majority in Parliament. These expectations, however, finally proved unfounded, since PASOK managed to secure a second term in office, sufficiently convincingly to make friend and foe, both at home and abroad, take more seriously what had previously and superficially been regarded as a passing phenomenon.

The Communists lost ground in these elections and failed in their purpose to reduce PASOK to minority status, which might have tempted it to flirt with the idea of a coalition government (McDonald, R., 1985). There is no prospect of sharing power in the near future for either of the CPs except possibly on the fulfilment of two fundamental conditions: (a) a change of the electoral system to pure simple proportional representation, and (b) the collapse of the support PASOK enjoys within the left-wing constituency and popular classes both in the cities and the countryside. The first condition is highly unlikely to occur. Past experience suggests that political parties in Greece, when in power, find it difficult to resist the temptation to tailor the electoral system to their own advantage – unless forced to do otherwise – and there is no reason to believe that PASOK will behave any differently. In any case the electoral law is a powerful political weapon at the hands of PASOK and may be used as a bait to lure the Communist Left into a broader Left Alliance, most probably after an electoral contest, if PASOK so decides for whatever reasons. This, of course, A would involve a shift in PASOK’s power strategy of historical importance because it would open the door for left-wing coalition governments, under PASOK dominance, thus keeping the Right out of reach of power for a long time to come.

The second condition also remains highly doubtful. PASOK has established a commanding position in the political spectrum and given the absence of any real alternative from either Right or Left, it is difficult to see how this position could be effectively challenged. Certainly, there is presently a lot of commotion within the ruling party, following the new package of measures to stabilise the economy introduced early in October 198540,particularly among ‘left-wing radical’ trade unionists, and PASOK itself is undergoing a crisis of adjustment and transformation both as a movement and as a party. However, there is little indication so far that the CPs whose attitudes towards PASOK have always been ambivalent and who are currently engaged in a frontal attack against it, could even make any political capital out of a harsh economic situation which is expected to last or some years.

In the local elections held in October 1986, in the two rounds the KKE increased its share of municipalities by 10 (53 out of a total 303, as against 43 held from 1982). However, the party can derive little comfort from the fact that all its three ‘broad left’ candidates in the major cities of Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki did less well than its own ‘pure* party candidates in the 1982 local elections. Moreover, the failure of KKE to support the PASOK-backed candidate in Athens in the second round undoubtedly influenced its voters all over the country, allowing the Conservatives (ND) to wrest the cities from PASOK incumbent mayors. KKE tactics have certainly set its relations with PASOK on a new footing which is expected to be clarified in the forthcoming Congress. On the other hand, KKE-interior has barely managed to hold its position by winning only a handful of important municipalities.

It all looks, therefore, as if the twilight of the Greek Communist movement has already set in. The obstacles to development or further expansion L are formidable: structural factors pertaining to the movement itself and to Greek society as a whole are not conducive to substantial Communist advance. In electoral terms, the combined strength of both CPs in the last parliamentary election was less than EDA’s share of the vote in the 1960’s and hardly better than the scores of the inter-war period, 50 years ago.

It is difficult to see how the KKE, still dominated by leaders whose perspectives were shaped during the 1940’s, could possibly be reformed from within. It will remain a staunch pro-Soviet party with all the distinct historical, political, organisational and cultural characteristics this essay has tried to outline. No major changes can be expected either in the party’s forthcoming 12th Congress, to be held in May 1987. There is some small room for minor, superficial adjustments which, coupled with tactical flexibility and some inevitable transfusion of ‘new blood’ at the top party echelons, might give the party some grounds for believing that recovery and even advance are possible in the coming years which might remain permanent. however, no matter what electoral gains the KKE can possibly extract in the coming years from a situation of labour unrest and left-wing disenchantment, from a long-term point of view the party has entered a phase of historical decline, a process which cannot be arrested or reversed without major changes and adjustments at all levels.

The KKE-interior, on the other hand, is undergoing a serious identity crisis exemplified by the three-way split among those who would like to upgrade the party’s Eurocommunist image, those who argue in favour of changing its title and symbols and gradually evolving into a socialist workers’ party separate from the Communist movement, and those who would like to see the formation of a new party of the Broad Left embracing all shades of left-wing democratic socialist opinion41. After a protracted and sometimes acrimonious public debate the issue was in principle settled at the party’s 4th Congress (10-17 May 1986). The second and third tendencies under the charismatic Leonidas Kyrkos (the sole MP of the party) and Kostas Filinis (a veteran Communist and the sole MEP of the party) respectively, won the argument by securing 53.82% of the vote of 537 delegates representing 8,000 members approximately. Some unprecedented and extraordinary things happened in this Congress: Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism and democratic centralism were dropped and important constitutional changes were endorsed. Party factions were de facto recognised and the new 81-strong Central Committee was elected on a proportional voting system representing all currents of opinion within the party. Leonidas Kyrkos was duly elected as the party’s new General Secretary42. Above all a resolution which may prove ‘historic’ was adopted, namely to organise a  founding Congress of a new party of the Broad Left in spring 1987, in which its political physiognomy and programme and its constitution (from which Communist labels will be absent) will be fully discussed and decided with the expected participation of a broader left-wing constituency. These developments reflect a growing realisation that the KKE-interior has exhausted all of its possibilities for further advance and a new start together with other left-wing forces is absolutely necessary.

Certainly a lot of things can happen prior to k the 1987 Congress. The behaviour of the defeated faction under Yannis Banias will be crucial as will the ability of the party to inspire a wider spectrum of left-wing, democratic and progressive opinion. It is therefore clear that the creation of a new political formation in between KKE and PASOK is of crucial importance. However, it is difficult to assess the viability and potential of the future broad-left type political formation. For its part, the KKE will certainly be happy to vindicate finally its claim to be the exclusive representative of Greek Communists. Obviously, it will try hard to reduce the new party to a satellite role according to the goals of its latest policy of ‘Left frontism’, embracing and mobilising broader left-wing forces against PASOK. On the other hand, PASOK will probably resist any advance of the new party for potentially it represents a ‘serious threat to its own majority. In fact, the new party will find it difficult to establish a new clear-cut identity and consistent policies, so that to win a mass following, it will have always to keep its distance from both PASOK and KKE in order to show its distinctiveness vis-a-vis the other political forces. Speculation as to its possible impact and viability remain hypothetical.

What is beyond question however, is that the inter-communist dispute has come to an end without due ceremonial. Orthodoxy has prevailed and the KKE-interior has ceased effectively to be a ‘typical’ communist party. Despite these developments, what still remains an open question is also the re-definition and re-alignment of the Greek Left, which particularly under conditions of relative domestic hardship and crucial pending issues (like the continuing presence of US military bases, etc.) will be a bone of contention among left-wingers irrespective of their party affiliation. For, leaving aside orthodox Communism, the Greek Left will find it difficult to get rid of some ‘infantile disorders’. There is a growing sense of urgency about re-defining the socialist project and locating arguments for socialism and democracy on the terrain of new realities and new perspectives. Ideology will play a lesser role in all these explorations than it used to in the past. Labourism, economism, statism and corporatism, to mention but a few of the Left’s mortal sins, are by no means confined to the Greek Communists alone. No doubt, new and original ways of tackling the serious problems Greece is faced with as a national, economic and cultural entity, not just mimicking foreign models, are likely to be placed high in the agenda of re-defining a credible and viable Left alternative. Strategic topics too, like democracy, equality and liberty under a socialist system, and the right ingredients of the ‘mixed-economy’, will be certainly defined and discussed anew. Many policies so far designed only for oppositional purposes will be debated from different perspectives.

Amid increasing indications that larger sections of the non-communist Greek Left realise the enormous challenges of modern society and its international dimensions, it is likely that the new developments mentioned above will stimulate further debate. The constraints, domestic and international, and the real limitations of a socialist project under present conditions will probably constitute major focal points. The Communist Left can hardly contribute positively to the debate if its sticks to old platitudes. That socialism could take generations to achieve; the Greek Left will learn the hard way. The honeymoon and euphoria are over.

NOTES

  1. In 1918 the Socialistiko Ergatiko Komma Ellados (Socialist Workers’ Party of Greece – SKE) was founded. In 1920 the party joined the Third International, endorsing all of its 21 articles. In 1924 SEKE changed its title to Kommounistiko Komma tis Elladas (Communist Party of Greece – KKE).
  2. In 1931, after a protracted period of bitter fighting between factionalised leadership groups, the Third International stepped in and appointed N. Zachariades, a professional revolutionary trained in the Soviet Union, as party secretary. It is ironic, of course, that he was also deposed by outside intervention in 1956. The KKE was so Stalinist that neither defeat in the Civil War nor the shock waves of the 20th Congress of the CPSU managed to reform it. ‘De-Stalinisation was secured by massive expulsions of unreformed party members and intervention by ‘fraternal parties’. G Dej, the General Secretary of the Romanian CP made the report to the KKE’s C.C., listing its errors and mistakes. A new leader, C. Koliyannis, was installed.
  3. In the 1920s the KKE espoused a policy of ‘autonomy’ on the national question of Macedonia and Thrace (the so-called ‘Macedonian issue’). Although this policy was dropped later (1935), its revival during the Civil War badly tarnished the party’s image as a national force (cf. Kofos, E. Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, Institute of Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1964).
  4. See EDA, 1st Panhellenic Conference, Athens 1956 (in Greek).
  5. The 1st National Congress of EDA was convened in 1959 and its 2nd in 1962.
  6. The morning Avgi (Dawn) and the evening Dimokratiki Allaghi (Democratic Change).
  7. Elliniki Aristera (Greek Left).
  8. These mobilisations are known as the era of “15% and 114”, slogans signifying and epitomising the demand for more resources to be allocated to Education from the state budget and the patriotic defence of the Constitution against state abuses.
  9. Named after the left-wing MP G. Lambrakis, who was assassinated by the political underworld in May 1963, in Thessaloniki, an affair which became known worldwide through C. Gavras’s film “Z”. The Lambrakis Democratic Youth was founded in 1964 with the composer Mikis Theodorakis as chairman. It was effectively controlled by EDA and KKE cadres. However, it grew rapidly throughout the country, reaching probably between 40,000 and 45,000 members. In the Greek context, the Lambrakides constituted a quite innovative cultural and political movement, which soon became the bête noir of the security services and the Right.
  10. The KKE leaders in exile presumably felt that if they allowed EDA to develop its potential autonomously they might sooner or later find themselves redundant. That is why after 1965 they made a deliberate move to organise communist cells within EDA (a small number of weak and demoralised communist cells operating clandestinely inside Greece after the Civil War were dissolved in 1958), dividing the party militants into two classes: a Communist elite and a downgraded class of EDA-ists. Revolutionary “purity” was thus well preserved for KKE.
  11. For a Marxist theoretical approach, see D. Haralambis, Army and Political Power: the power structure in post-civil-war Greece, Exantas, Athens 1985 (in Greek).
  12. At the 12th plenary of the CC convened abroad (February 1968). For a revealing collection of documents, see P. Dimitriou, The Split of the KKE. Themelio, Athens 1978, 2 vol. (in Greek).
  13. EKON “Rigas Fereos” (Greek Communist Youth Organisation), named after a hero of the pre-revolutionary period of the Greek War of Independence (1821), was founded in 1967, immediately after the establishment of the dictatorship. Rigas played a protagonist role in the Polytechnic uprising (Nov. 1973).
  14. KNE (Communist Youth of Greece) was founded in 1968 and bore the name of the party’s pre-war Youth Organisation.
  15. Florakis replaced Koliyannis as General Secretary of the KKE at the 17th plenary of the CC in 1973. He still leads the party.
  16. Drakopoulos, one of the leaders of EDA and the “Interior Bureau” of the KKE, stayed at the head of the KKE-interior till 1982.
  17. EDA was soon to withdraw from inter-Communist antagonism. Whereas in the 1977 parliamentary elections it had joined an electoral alliance with the Eurocommunists, the party was eventually steered towards PASOK and has since run all subsequent General and European elections on its ticket (1981, 1984, and 1985).
  18. See Brillakis, A. The Greek Communist Movement, Exantas, Athens 1980 (in Greek). At a recent plenary of the CC (December 1985) quite a few different accounts of the party’s course over the past years were presented.
  19. During the 1977 electoral period, the Soviets had mounted an ambitious radio propaganda campaign in support of the KKE.
  20. See the KKE-interior’s declaration, “The goals of the nation”, Athens 4-9-74 (in Greek).
  21. In the wake of the 1977 electoral defeat and the ensuing crisis a substantial section of dissident leftists split from its Youth Organisation.
  22. Official figures are not released. It is estimated, however, that membership is between 100,000 and 120,000 including nearly 30,000 of the party’s Youth Organisation (of 15-26 year olds).
  23. The sociological portrait of party membership can be cautiously inferred from official figures released in the 10th Congress (15-20/5/78) for 674 delegates. They were classified as workers (39%), employees (16%), peasants (9%), middle strata (5%), intellectuals (20.4%) and students (11.8%), having a “party life” of 15.4 years on average and an age of 39 years. Nearly 37% of them joined the party during 1975-78. Moreover, according to official party figures 53% of its cadres are classified as workers-employees. (See Report to the 11th Congress 1982 by the General Secretary, Florakis).
  24. The Company, TYPOEKDOTIKI SA, ranks 166 among the 200 largest Greek manufacturing firms classified by total assets (1983), and 2nd amongst the 15 largest industries in the printing and publishing branch classified according to the same criterion (See Greece in Figures, ICAP, Athens 1985). Besides, according to the data released by the parties for the 1985 (an election year) expenditures the KKE declared an amount of 724,185,531 drachmas (£3.62m approx) as against 214,484,048 drachmas (£1.07m approx) of KKE-interior and 952,339,595 drachmas (£4.76m approx) of the ruling PASOK party and 1,308,630,227 drachmas (£6.54m approx) of the Conservative main opposition party of New Democracy.
  25. Rizospastis (Radical), the KKE1s national daily (broadsheet) sold 57,212 copies on average (October 1985), a share of 47.5% of all morning papers (6.9% of all dailies). The Sunday edition usually sells between 60,000 – 70,000 copies, a share of nearly 13% of all Sundays (Athens-Piraeus area). A Monday tabloid edition sells between 18,000-22,000 copies (Figures from the Greek weekly paper TO PONTIKI (The Mouse), 18-12-85). A new evening paper I PROTI (The First) was published in April 1986 whose owners and editors are known to be very close to the party. It is also evident that the party’s views are extensively reported by leading evening papers like TO ETHNOS (The Nation), ΤΑ NEA (The News), and ELEFTHEROTYPIA (Free Press).
  26. At the 22nd Congress of the Greek TUC (GSEE) held in December 1983 and representing 570,638 balloted members, the KKE elected 17 members to the governing Committee, as against 2 for the KKE-interior. Both parties boycotted the 23rd Congress of GSEE held in April 1986.
  27. In the latest elections for students’ unions (April 1986) the KKE won 29.13% of the total vote as against 10.14% for the KKE-interior. Over 12 electoral contests in the students’ unions since 1974, the KKE’s share of the vote fluctuated between 25-30% whereas the KKE-interior’s vote declined by half.
  28. In all post-junta municipal elections (1975, 1978 and 1982) the KKE has made a strong showing. It now controls 45 municipalities out of a total of 276 and 229 communities out of 5,545. Its influence on other municipal councils in major cities is also particularly strong. The KKE-interior, on the other hand, controls 3-4 municipalities and elected (1982) no more than a hundred councillors nationally.
  29. In the organisations of the liberal professions (lawyers, doctors, civil engineers, architects, teachers etc.) both parties score between 15-25% of the vote. However, the KKE is far stronger in the trade unions of the public sector, including banking.
  30. Approved by the 9th Congress (1973) and as amended (Introduction and articles 4 and 28) at the 10th Congress (1978).
  31. The Constitution of the party was approved at the 1st Congress (1976).
  32. Between 12,000 and 14,000 members, including 5,000-6,000 members of the Youth Organisation. More than half of total membership was recruited between 1974 and 1982 (3rd Congress figures – 1982). In the 4th Congress (May 1986) the total number of balloted party members was 6,131 with another 1,701 of its Youth Organisation.
  33. The morning daily Avgi (Dawn) shares 7% of the total circulation of morning papers and less than 1% of the total circulation of all national dailies. The monthly review I ARISTERA SIMERA (The Left Today) is rapidly following in the steps of Marxism Today.
  34. The KKE controls the Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace – EEDYE, whereas the more independent Non-Aligned Peace Movement – AKE leans towards KKE-interior.
  35. See Y. Anastassakos, “Elections ’85: An analysis of the results” in I ARISTERA SIMERA, No. 12-13, June-September 1985 (in Greek). See also Y. Loulis, Epikentra, May-June 1985 (in Greek) and M. Drettakis, National and European Elections of 1981, Athens 1984 (in Greek).
  36. Approved by the 9th Congress (1973) and as amended by the 10th (1978).
  37. Programme (1978), p.24.
  38. Endorsed by the 1st Congress (1976).
  39. In an article on the decline of Eurocommunism by E. Mortimer and M. Modiano, 23-2-84.
  40. See Financial Times, 8/2/86 and Greece, special report (3/2/86). See also Greece, monthly bulletin published by Greek Press and Information Office – London, No 4-6 (November 1985 – January 1986).
  41. See KKE-interior’s Positions for the 4th Congress in Avgi (22/1, 29/l and 1/2/86) and the debate in the party and national Press.
  42. Kyrkos, was elected General Secretary by the New Central Committee on 20/5/86 with 45 votes cast in his favour. Another 33 ballots were found blank and 2 others were invalidated.

REFERENCES

Alivizatos, N. (1979) Les institutions politiques de la Grèce a travers les Crises: 1922-1974, Paris, 1979.

Catephores, G. “Greece in the hour of change” in Marxism Today, Dec. 1981.

Clogg, R. “Greece: the year of the Green Sun” in The World Today, Nov. 1981.

Clogg, R. Parties and Elections in Greece: The search for legitimacy, forthcoming, London 1986.

Clogg, R. and Yannopoulos, G. (eds.), Greece under Military Rule, Seeker and Warburg, London 1972. Couloumbis, Th. “Post World War II – Greece: A political review” in Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy (Hearings – House of Representatives), Washington 1971.

Danopoulos, C. Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece, Documentary Publications, USA 1984. Diamandouros, N. “Transition to, and Consolidation of, democratic politics in Greece, 1974-1983: a tentative assessment” in West European Politics, VII (1984) 50-71.

Featherstone, K. “Elections and Parties in Greece”, in Government and Opposition, vol. 17, no. 2, Spring 1982.

Kapetanyannis, B. “The making of Greek Euro-communism” in The Political Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 4, 4 Dec. 1979.

Kapetanyannis, V. Socio-political conflicts and military intervention: the case of Greece 1950-1967, Ph.D. thesis, Birckbeck College, University of London, 1986.

Legg, K. Politics in Modern Greece, Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, California, 1969.

Martin, St. C., Lambrakides; The history of a generation, A thesis in French published in Greek by Polytypo, Athens, 1987.

McDonald, R. “Greece after PASOK’s victory” in The World Today, no. 7, July 1985.

Meynaud, J. Les forces politiques en Grèce, Lausanne, 1965.

J Mouzelis, N. “Rise and fall of the Greek Junta” in New Left Review, No 96, March-April 1976. Mouzelis, N. Modern Greece; facets of underdevelopment, Macmillan, London 1978[a].

Mouzelis, N. “On the Greek Elections” in New Left Review, April 1978[b].

Mouzelis, N. “Class and clientelistic politics: the case of Greece, in The Sociological Review, vol. 26, No. 3, August 1978[c].

Mouzelis, N. Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America, Macmillan, 1986. Papandreou, A. Democracy at Gunpoint, Penguin 1973. Penniman, H. (ed.), Greece at the polls: the National Elections of 1974 and 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington and London, 1981.

Stavrou, N. Allied Politics and Military Interventions: the political role of the Greek military, Papazissis, Athens, 1977.

Tsoukalas, K. The Greek Tragedy, Penguin 1969.

Veremis, Th. “Greece: Veto and Impasse, 1967-74” in C. Clapham and G. Philip (eds.), The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, Croom Helm, 1985.

Woodhouse, C. The Rise and fall of the Greek Colonels, Granada 1985.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The bibliography on the Greek Communist movement is huge. The recently published massive bibliography by Dr H A Richter (Greece and Cyprus since 1820: Bibliography of Contemporary History/Griechenland und Zypern Seit 1920: Bibligraphie zur Zeitgeschichte/Ellada Kai Kypros meta to 1920: Vivliographia synchronis istorias.

Heidelberg: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Nea Hellas, 1984, 437 pages) is an excellent guide, for it contains a separate section on communist affairs of about 1,700 entries sub-divided in sensible chronological periods. However, for the sake of the foreign general reader, only a limited selection of foreign titles is included in this essay.

COMMUNIST LEADERS

EDA (United Democratic Left) – 1951-1967

  1. Ioannis Passalidis – Chairman, born in 1885 in Georgia, Russia. A moderate socialist, founder of the small Greek Socialist Party which joined EAM (National Liberation Front) during the Resistance. Elected in all post – Civil War Parliaments (1951, 1956, 1958, 1961, 1963 and 1964). Died in 1972.
  2. Elias Eliou – Parliamentary leader from 1956. Member of EDA’s Executive Committee since 1961. Born in 1904 in Greek Aegean island of Limnos. A lawyer by training. Elected 1956, 1958, 1961, 1963 and 1964. Brilliant orator and politician. Left-wing socialist rather than Communist in persuasion and practice. Did not join any Communist party after 1974. EDA’s sole MP in 1974 and 1977. Died 1985.

KKE (Communist Party of Greece) – 1918 –

  1. Nikos Zachariades – Installed General Secretary (1934) by the Third International. Born in 1902 in Asia Minor. Arrested in 1936 by the Metaxas dictatorship. Transferred to German concentration camp. Returned to Greece (1945) and assumed the leadership. Led the KKE during the Civil War (1946-49) and in exile until 1956, when deposed by “fraternal parties”. A staunch Stalinist. Died in 1973, somewhere in the Soviet Union.
  2. Kostas Koliyannis – Born in 1909 in Thebes, Greece. A close Zachariades associate; succeeded him in 1956 after Soviet backing. Elected 1st Secretary at the 8th Congress (1961). Ousted in 1972 and died in Budapest in 1979, rather forgotten.
  3. Harilaos Florakis – born in 1914 in Karditsa, Greece. Served 17 years in prison intermittently. Elected 1st Secretary of the CC at the 17th Plenary in 1973. A traditional Communist with a “moderate” position. Practical and popular politician with good television performance. An MP in 1974, 1977, 1981 and 1985 Parliaments.

KKE esoterikou (Communist Party of Greece-interior) – 1968 –

  1. Babis Drakopoulos – born in 1917 in Athens. Headed the “Interior Bureau”, the Communist command faction within EDA in the 1960s. Spent many years in prison. Elected General Secretary in 1976 (1st Congress). MP in 1974. Lost his seat in 1977. Led the party in its most crucial period and failed. Devoted Eurocommunist with traditional outlook. Unexperienced, flat and colourless politician.
  2. Yannis Banias – Born in 1940. Elected General Secretary in the 3rd Congress (1982) amid a leadership crisis. Able, experienced organiser, but very little public experience in politics. Failed to be elected MP in 1985 by some hundreds of votes. Left-wing Eurocommunist, temperamental and with shifting positions. A civil engineer by profession. He was removed from his party position at the 4th Congress (May 1986).
  3. Leonidas Kyrkos – Born in 1924 in Heraklion, Crete. Studied medicine. Sentenced to death in 1949. Released in 1954. Elected EDA MP in 1961, 1963 and 1964. Spent many years in prison under the colonels. Elected MP in 1974 and 1977. Failed to be elected in 1981 but elected MEP. Returned MEP again in 1984 and KKE-interior1s sole MP in 1985. Chairman of the party from spring 1985. Charismatic and astute politician. Fascinating emotional public speaker and brilliant parliamentary orator. Wider public appeal. Elected General Secretary of the party in the 4th Congress (May 1986).

TABLE I the Communist Vote 1951-1985 

Election Seats Party Votes % Votes Seat
1951 258 EDAa 180,640 10.57 10b
1952 300 EDA 152,011 9.55 0
1956c 300 DEd – – 18
1958 300 EDA 939,902 24.42 79e
1961 300 PAMEf 675,959 14.62 249
1963 300 EDA 669,267 14.34 28h
1964 300 EDA 540,687i 11.80 22j
1974 300 EAk 464,787 9.47 8l
1977 300 KKE 480,272 9.36 11
    SPkADm 139,356 2.72 2h
19810 300 KKE 620,302 10.93 13P
    KKEE 76,404 1.34 –
1981q 24 KKE 729,052 12.84 3
    KKEE 300,841 5.29 1
1984r 24 KKE 693,304 11.64 3
    KKEE 203,813 3.42 1
1985 300 KKE 629,518 9.89 12s
    KKEE 117,050 1.84 1

Party names: EDA (Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera); DE (Dimokratiki Enosis); PAME (Pandimokratiko Agrotiko Metopo Ellados); EA (Enomeni Aristera); KKE (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas); SPkAD (Symmahia Proodeftikon kai Aristeron Dynameon).

  1. United Democratic Left – EDA
  2. EDA (8), Others (2)
  3. This was the first general election in which women had the right to vote.
  4. Due to the electoral system EDA joined the electoral alliance of Dimokratiki Enosis (Democratic Union), which won 48.2% of the vote and 132 seats (44% of the total). However, the Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis (National Radical Union – ERE) of K. Karamanlis with 47.4% of the vote won 165 seats and formed a majority government.
  5. EDA (58), Others (21)
  6. Pandemocratic Agrarian Front of Greece (PAME). Electoral alliance of EDA and the rather insignificant Ethniko Agrotiko Komma (National Agrarian Party). The result of the election was denounced both by EDA and the Enosis Kentrou (Centre Union – EK) party of George Papandreou as a product of ‘violence and fraud’.
  7. EDA (20), Others (4)
  8. EDA (22), Others (6)
  9. EDA did not contest the election in 24 constituencies (out of 55), where it instructed its supporters to vote for EK, a deliberate policy to defeat the ruling ERE.
  10. EDA (19), Others (3)
  11. United Left. Electoral Alliance of Kommounistiko Komma Elladas (Communist Party of Greece – KKE), Kommounistiko Komma Elladas Esoterikou (Communist Party of Greece – Interior – KKE int.) and EDA
  12. KKE (5), KKE int. (2), EDA (1)
  13. Alliance of Progressive and Left-wing Forces. Electoral alliance of KKE int. and the small political groupings of EDA, Socialistiki Poreia (Socialist Course), Socialistiki Protovoulia (Socialist Initiative) and Christianiki Dimokratia (Christian Democracy).
  14. KKE int. (1), EDA (1).
  15. The voting age was lowered to 20.
  16. KKE (12), Others (1).
  17. European Election. It was held simultaneously with the general election.
  18. European Election. Included the votes of Greeks abroad. Voting age lowered to 18.
  19. KKE (10), Others (2).

Sources;

Greek Ministry of the Interior, Electoral Statistics; General Secretariat for Press and Information, Post War Elections in Greece 1946-1977 ; Press and Information Office – Embassy of Greece, London, bulletin: Greece: Background News and Information (No.5, 6/1974; 76/1977; 141/1981; Special issue/July 1985); Meynaud, J. Les Forces Politiques en Grèce, Lausanne 1965; Penniman, H. (ed.), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of 1974 and 1977; Clogg, R. “Greece”, in Bogdanor, V. and Butler, D., Democracy and Elections, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983; Clogg, R. Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy, London 1986; Drettakis, M., Parliamentary Elections 1974, 1977, 1981: A Comparative Analysis, Athens 1982 (in Greek). Drettakis, M., National and European Elections 1981, Athens 1984 (in Greek); Nikolakopoulos, E., Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections in Greece 1946-1964, National Centre of Social Research, Athens 1985 (in Greek); Athens News Agency, Results of National and European Parliamentary Elections since 1974, no. 28/1985; Athens News Agency, Elections: Analysis of 1974-1977-1981 Parliamentary Elections and 1981-1984 European Parliament Elections, no.39/1985.

Political Change in Greece: Before and After The Colonels
Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas

Palgrave Macmillan

ISBN: 0-7099-1091-6

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