The Left In The 1980s: Too Little, Too Late

GREECE 1981-89 THE POPULIST DECADE

INTRODUCTION

It is not easy to talk about the Greek left in the particular context of political developments in the 1980s. This is for two basic reasons. Firstly, because that part of the political spectrum traditionally occupied by the communist left – in the absence of any serious socialist political tradition – was strongly challenged for the first time in the post-civil war period by the newly-formed (1974) Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). It is certainly true that one can trace many elements of left- wing radicalism back to the mid-1960s when Andreas Papandreou, a newcomer to the political stage, became a focus of ideological and political loyalty on the part of a substantial faction of his father, Georgios Papandreou’s Enosis Kentrou and by younger elements in the electorate. However, this radicalism was cut short by the military coup of 1967 and the establishment of the military regime (1967-74). Left-wing radicalism not only resurfaced after the fall of the military junta in 1974, strengthened by various resistance groups, but also acquired a new impetus in the general mood for fundamental change. Having absorbed, both electorally and ideologically, the bulk of the centre and centre-left political forces during the 1970s, PASOK was in a position not only to challenge effectively the communist left but also the ruling conservative Nea Dimokratia party by winning by a landslide in the 1981 general election.1

It is important also to note that from the point of view of party organisation, inner-party democracy, methods of political mobilisation and ideology, its extreme rhetoric (anti-EC, anti-NATO, anti-US, etc.) as well as in respect of its electoral basis, a substantial part of which consisted of ex- communists and other left-wing voters drawn mainly from the resistance (1941-44) and civil war (1947-49) periods, PASOK looked like a party of the left more often than not. However this may be, PASOK sought with great success to become a vehicle of radical left-wing change and was strongly identified with the ‘anti-rightist’ political tradition. Barely one year into the 1980s PASOK won office in 1981 with an absolute majority in parliament, breaking an almost uninterrupted right-wing grip on power of nearly 40 years.2

At the beginning of the 1980s the ‘left’ – both the ruling PASOK and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) – commanded a comfortable parliamentary majority, a social and political majority, and occupied a dominant ideological position vis-a-vis a defeated and demoralised conservative camp that had been reduced in electoral terms to well below 40 per cent of the total vote. In short, one could hardly imagine more favourable domestic conditions in which to apply and realise the left’s project of social and political reforms that it had propagated for decades. In a wider European context, PASOK together with other socialist parties of Southern Europe, dominated the governments of their respective countries at a time when Northern Europe had shifted to the political right. During the 1980s the neo-conservatives and neo-liberals who dominated the ideological and political agenda, as well the terms of reference for the relevant debates in Northern Europe, were out of office in Southern Europe. For the sake of understanding the crucial dimension of the ‘left’ in Greek politics, and particularly its role in the 1980s, PASOK should rather be thought of as a ‘left-wing’ party in the broadest sense of the term, taking into account its quite distinct features as a political party and movement in relation to its European socialist counterparts.

PASOK IN POWER

PASOK’s overwhelming electoral victory in 1981 surprised only those unwilling to sense the sweeping mood for change that existed in Greek society. However, winning elections is one thing; governing a country and/or planning and effecting social reforms is quite another.3 From an electoral point of view, PASOK resembled a catch-all rather than a modem class-based party. Throughout the decade it remained very much a party and a movement structured predominantly around the undisputed and charismatic personality4 of its leader, Andreas Papandreou. The logic of populism prevailed. Political practice, style and behaviour followed suit. It is a truism that when PASOK came to power it brought with it its particular structure, organisational customs and patterns.5 Ultimately, any post-mortem on PASOK’s failure in power can hardly avoid questions arising not only from its own internal organisational structures as a party, but also from its policies vis-a-vis a changing domestic and international environment, internal and external constraints, and, last but not least, corruption as a by-product of the failure to reform both party and state structures. Political and ideological traditions as well as the role of the charismatic leader contributed to the decay, to a style of government which alienated intellectuals and substantial sections of the middle classes, and to a state authoritarianism as the only alternative with which to fill a vacuum of leadership, policies and political vision. PASOK’s apparent failure and dismal performance in the fields of the economy and foreign policy should not lead one to underestimate a number of long-overdue social and institutional changes and reforms that were introduced during its eight-year rule. These included reforms in family law, higher education, health and the social security system. However, these reforms were not financed by sustained economic growth. One can hardly detect any serious redistribution of income between social groups and particularly in favour of the lower ones. State consumption was financed by heavy external borrowing which increased public indebtedness nearly fourfold during the decade 1980-90 (from $5 billion to $20 billion). The expansion of the state, the suffocation of the private sector and a statist mentality and practices, amid adverse international economic conditions, led to a severe economic crisis in 1985. An EC-funded stabilisation programme (1986-87) was necessary to restore some confidence and to signal a return to growth in private investment.

Greece had slipped from being the eleventh economy in the Community, ahead only of Portugal, to being the last, by the end of PASOK’s decade in office. Its rate of growth in GDP, in terms of relative purchasing power parities, actually declined during the 1980s from 58.4 per cent of the Community average to 51.1 per cent. Despite the fact that net inflows from the EC between 1981 and 1991 amounted to $13.8 billion, not counting a further 4.5 billion ECUs from the European Investment Bank and the loan of $1.8 billion to support the economy in 1986, Greece has been unable to catch up with the pace of growth and structural change in other EC member countries. At the end of its second term in office (1989) PASOK left an economy in ruins and public finances in a state of collapse. It is characteristic that the 1991 budget projections foresee a sharp reduction in the public sector borrowing requirement from 16.6 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 11.3 per cent in 1991.6 The need for massive increases in public revenues by raising indirect taxes and the prices of all public utilities, as well as securing an EC loan of about $2.2 billion to relieve a balance of payments crisis and to assist in stabilising the economy (under EC scrutiny and tutelage), are indicative of the dire state of the economy.

Besides, PASOK failed completely to reform an overinflated and notoriously inefficient public administration. Not only was the public sector expanded but the bureaucracy was also enlarged with the addition of more than 100 000 to the public payroll. The state apparatus was colonised from top to bottom by the party faithful, other hangers-on and voters in the best Greek traditions of patronage, clientelism and the distribution of the spoils of power. The phenomenon of the ‘greenguards’, who having been appointed to key positions in the public administration, were keen to promote party policies and to control the state machinery from within, has been a by-product of the fusion of party and state. Many party members took governmental positions or other public posts and the party machine was thrown into some disarray. Moreover the party was purged in 1985 of dissenting and discordant voices. Leading party members and trade-unionists were swiftly expelled because they opposed and publicly criticised government economic policies. A strict two-year programme of economic stabilisation (1985-87) seriously undermined the position of the party within the trade-union movement. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that no group that split from PASOK managed to provide any credible alternative, to shake the party or the cohesion of the government or managed to have any significant electoral appeal. No prominent party- member or group had any chance of political survival or of independent political existence outside the ‘fold’, or of Papandreou’s protective embrace.7 It is necessary to understand these aspects of PASOK’s configuration in order better to understand relations between the parties of the left. Finally, at the beginning of the 1980s a number of other important factors should be taken into account to place the period of PASOK rule in a wider political context.

  1. The October 1981 elections marked a historic shift in the locus of power away from the right. It was followed by a remarkably smooth transition from the Rallis to the Papandreou government. The smooth alternation of parties in government indicated that the post-1974 democratic institutions formalised by the 1975 constitution had passed successfully their first major test. The presence of Konstantinos Karamanlis as head of state not only added weight to the legitimacy of the process but greatly enhanced the stability of the political system.
  2. The armed forces and security services were not involved in the electoral and political process. Another source of instability within the political system had thus been removed.8
  3. Papandreou himself and his party underwent a gradual transformation from a ‘protest movement’ to the status of an acceptable political formation which was to assume governmental responsibilities in 1981. The neutralist outlook was dropped. On the issue of membership of the EC, Papandreou abandoned his pre-election demands for a referendum (the calling of which, in any case, was a prerogative of the president) on Greece’s continued membership.9 It is doubtful whether Papandreou advanced his understanding of the EC much beyond the ‘milch cow’ perception. However, it is true that, through the government’s memorandum to the EC in 1982, he not only gained time to adjust to the new conditions but also played his cards well in securing the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMP), thus ensuring more capital inflows for development projects. Similarly, with respect to NATO, Papandreou did not carry out his threats to withdraw but rather sought to voice his positions loudly. Finally, on the crucial issue of the maintenance and continued operation of the American military installations, Papandreou signed in 1983 a new five- year Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). In short, a new bi-partisan foreign policy, a consensual approach, began to emerge, despite PASOK’s rhetoric.
  4. Greece had already been a full EC member as from 1 January 1981. This was a fact that PASOK could not ignore.
  5. The institutional balance between prime minister and the president of the Republic was abruptly redressed in favour of the former. In 1985 Papandreou, contrary to all indications, refused to support Karamanlis for a second consecutive five-year term as president and secured the election of his own candidate by dubious political and procedural means, abusing basic written and customary rules. An obstacle to Papandreou’s ambitions was thus removed but, at the same time, PASOK lost an easy alibi, that of shifting responsibility somewhere else. Its power was now more naked than before.
  6. PASOK could not resist the temptation to manipulate the country’s electoral system to its advantage. To the dismay of the communist left, PASOK reneged on its pre-electoral pledge to implement simple PR as a permanent system. Instead the government introduced through the back-door a system of reinforced (weighted) proportional representation. In view of PASOK’s rapidly declining fortunes, for the June 1989 elections the electoral system was manipulated so as to make it nearly impossible for the first party at the polls to win an absolute majority in parliament, even a slight one, even if it secured a high percentage of the total vote.
  7. In both the 1981 and 1985 elections PASOK succeeded in winning an absolute working parliamentary majority. Apart from the 1985 election of a new president in parliament, PASOK did not need any parliamentary support from the communist left.

All the above played an important role in shaping a very unstable and unpredictable relationship between the parties of the left.

THE COMMUNIST LEFT

No political movement in Greece has shown such endurance and resilience nor witnessed such dramatic changes in its fortunes as the communists. The heroic period of the resistance against Nazi occupation during the Second World War and the ensuing civil war after the liberation (1946-49) has inexorably marked the postwar development of the communist movement politically, ideologically and psychologically. Even today the party’s leadership and professional structure continue to be dominated by an ageing, and out-of-touch, generation whose entire political culture and practices are imbued by the experiences and ideas of the 1940s.

Communist orthodoxy is deeply rooted in Greek soil and has always attracted genuine popular support irrespective of the communist party’s (KKE) obvious and persistent subservience towards the Soviet Union. Indeed it could be argued that such subservience has been more of an asset than a liability in attracting support and closing ranks. At the same time it has clearly been an obstacle to its expansion. Loyalty to the Soviet Union, the ‘Motherland of Socialism’ was an article of faith, the yardstick against which ‘true’ revolutionaries should be measured. Greek communists, being no exception to the rule, were used as pawns in a chess-game whose rules they willingly accepted. The communist movement in Greece represents a tradition very tightly interwoven with the country’s modem political history, particularly during the interwar period and after. In its European context this tradition is perhaps unique in the sense that in the absence of any strong socialist or social democratic tradition or even a powerful and autonomous labour movement in the country, the left of the political spectrum has always been dominated by the communists.

Neither devastating defeat in the civil war nor the 1968 split in the party10 managed to shake communist orthodoxy. The establishment of the military regime (1967-74) was a catalyst for the communist movement in many important ways. The 1968 split, which resulted in the formation of a small but intellectually and morally very influential Euro-communist party (the KKE-es or Communist party of the interior), did nothing to force the orthodox KKE to change course or rethink its policies.

The inter-communist conflict was settled after the fall of the military junta in 1974, particularly in the 1977 general election when communist voters opted for orthodoxy and rejected Euro-communist ‘renovation’.11 By the time of the October 1981 elections the battle was over. The Eurocommunists fared badly with 1.34 per cent of the total vote and no seats in parliament. (Their 5.3 per cent (one MEP) showing in the simultaneous Euro-elections was a small consolation.) By contrast, the KKE won 10.93 per cent of the vote and 13 seats (out of a total of 300). In the Euroelections its 12.7 per cent share of the vote translated into three seats (out of 24). Broadly speaking, both communist parties failed to make any political capital out of the rapid radicalisation of large urban and rural sections of the electorate. It was PASOK which reaped the political benefits by its sweeping victory, shattering the myth that a ‘socialist’ movement of such a kind could not emerge in Greece, let alone win power. Many disillusioned old-timers deserted both parties and opted for the more realistic choice of voting for PASOK. In the European elections of June 1984 both the KKE and KKE-interior did rather well by winning an 11.6 per cent as against a 3.4 per cent share of the vote, and two seats as against one respectively (out of a total of 24). It is important to note that during the campaign the KKE muted its criticism of PASOK – whereas the party’s election slogan, ‘No to the EEC. Yes to change’, summed up the KKE’s philosophy and approach. It is also important to note that Nea Dimokratia, now under the leadership of Evangelos Averoff, once more failed to impress the electorate although its share of the vote rose to 38.1 per cent. On the other hand, PASOK, with 41.6 per cent of the vote, could claim a marginal increase in its share in comparison with the 1981 European election. However, it had lost 6.5 per cent in comparison with the 1981 national election. What was more significant was that PASOK’s vote held up better in rural areas,12 whereas the combined vote of both communist parties was not such as to provide any grounds for assuming a major shift from PASOK to the communist left. The KKE’s marginal gains, in an atmosphere of intense anti-rightist sentiment, did not alter the balance of power between PASOK and the communists.

The next round of the contest between the parties of the left was fought in June 1985. The election of Konstantinos Mitsotakis as leader of Nea Dimokratia in September 1984 had already provoked a strong reaction on the part of Andreas Papandreou. Two old foes from the sixties were now heading for another clash, raising the political temperature and sweeping to one side the crucial economic and political issues. Personal animosity orchestrated by the popular press of both sides became the focus of attention. In these elections, too, the communists failed to advance. The KKE scored only 9.9 per cent (12 seats) whereas the Eurocommunists managed to re-elect Leonidas Kyrkos, their leader, with 1.8 per cent of the total vote. Once more PASOK succeeded in attracting left-wing voters by exploiting their memories and anti-rightist instincts and by painting a picture of a vengeful and bloodthirsty right. In these polarised conditions, a contest between ‘light and darkness’, as one PASOK minister put it, Nea Dimokratia was defeated, and PASOK comfortably won a second term in office with an absolute parliamentary majority.

The electoral results show that the communist left was unable to pick up the votes of disaffected PASOK left-wingers. The KKE failed to portray itself as the champion of ‘true change’ and of outflanking PASOK in left- wing policies and rhetoric. Despite the KKE’s enormous resources and considerable political influence in all sectors of civil society (trade unions, student unions, local government and professional organisations),13 its electoral stagnation was a matter of great concern. As a matter of fact, the combined strength of both communist parties was hardly better than its performance fifty years earlier, during the interwar period. It was obvious that the communist movement had entered a phase of irreversible historical decline, a process which could not be arrested or reversed without deep and major changes and adjustments at all levels, structural, organisational and in policymaking.

Nevertheless, new opportunities for electoral advances were to present themselves. In October 1985 the PASOK government introduced a package of austerity measures designed to save the economy from collapse and later obtained an EC loan toward that end. Labour reaction had been vigorous and widespread, and PASOK lost its majority within the 45-member governing council of the General Confederation of Greek Labour, when several of its members representing powerful public sector unions raised objections to the endorsement of the U-turn in economic policy and aligned themselves with the opposition of the left. Relations between the KKE and PASOK went from bad to worse and a turning-point was reached at the local elections held in October 1986. In the two rounds of voting, the KKE increased the share of municipalities which it controlled by 10 (53 out of a total of 303). Most importantly, the KKE fired a warning-shot against PASOK’s monopolistic grip on power and arrogance by failing to support in the second round the PASOK-backed candidates in the three major municipalities of Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki. That decision undoubtedly influenced its voters, allowing Nea Dimokratia to wrest these cities from incumbent PASOK mayors and thus acquire a new power basis from which to launch a political offensive against the socialists. KKE tactics further strained relations with PASOK and set them on a new footing with obvious confrontational elements. PASOK castigated this behaviour as an ‘unholy alliance’.

The relatively successful implementation of the economic stabilisation programme under the firm, calm and low-profile management of national economy minister Kostas Simitis came to an abrupt end when Papandreou, in a new U-turn, relaxed incomes policy for 1988, forcing Simitis to resign in November 1987. What had been achieved so painfully was now destroyed in the course of the following years. Finance minister Dimitris Tsovolas was given a free hand to increase public deficits by satisfying excessive wage demands. The doors of the government bureaucracy were flung wide-open to accept tens of thousands of party followers, as the elections of 1989 approached.

In the meantime PASOK’s fortunes had started to decline rapidly. Papandreou underwent a heart operation at Harefield hospital, outside London, in September 1988 and returned home in October to face a growing domestic political crisis and a power-vacuum created by his absence and ill-health. The ‘Koskotas scandal’, which had been brewing for some time, came to a head as the dubious dealings of the ambitious banker and press baron George Koskotas were revealed by the press. The government faced strong attacks from the opposition parties for its handling of the matter, was forced to set up a fact-finding parliamentary committee to investigate the case and survived a motion of censure in parliament. However, the time-bomb of the Koskotas affair continued to tick. The banker, who was wanted for multi-million-dollar embezzlement and illegal currency transactions, fled the country but was arrested at a Massachussetts airfield in November 1988. Many prominent PASOK members and ministers were alleged to be involved in the scandal and the role of deputy prime minister Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas was given particular prominence. A series of other scandals erupted. Needless to say, all these ‘scandal cases’ became a matter of fierce accusations and counter-accusations as the popular press of both sides fanned the flames with venomous personal attacks on political leaders. All weapons were thrown into the battle as the June 1989 elections approached in a political climate replete with vengeance, poison, recriminations and mudslinging.

In these circumstances the KKE was careful not to unduly offend the government, fearing its downfall before a new electoral law was voted, which was expected to be more favourable to the left; that is to say, more proportional than the existing one. On the other hand, PASOK dug its heels in and left the new electoral law to be debated in, and passed by, parliament until the last possible moment before the elections.

A LEAP FORWARD

Meanwhile, in the communist camp, important changes were taking place. A new political formation, the left Coalition (Synaspismos) was formed by the KKE and the broadly Eurocommunist Elliniki Aristera. Former PASOK ministers and other small political groups on the left joined the coalition. An agreement on principles was published on 8 December 1988. The coalition’s aim was to provide an alternative rallying-point for the left, to deprive PASOK of its absolute majority in the coming elections and to exploit any situation resulting from a hung parliament. It believed that the corruption and mismanagement of the economy, political opportunism and authoritarian practices to which the ruling party resorted to fend off rising discontent, provided an ideal opportunity for a political breakthrough in public and political life. Electoral tactics were adjusted to that goal. However, the formation of the Coalition signified something more than a temporary electoral alliance. The inter-communist rift had come to an end, the ground having been carefully prepared by both sides during the previous year.

A majority decision of the fourth congress of the KKE-interior held in Athens in May 1986 had paved the way for the emergence of the new party on the left. Eurocommunists joined forces with a number of small left-wing, feminist, ecology and independent groups to hold a congress in Athens in April 1987, attended by 800 delegates, which gave birth to the Elliniki Aristera (EAR). The new party, an alternative for disaffected supporters of both the orthodox KKE and the ruling PASOK, claimed 12 000 founding members, about one-half of whom belonged to the KKE- interior, while a minority of the latter under former general secretary Yannis Banias stood firm and refused to join in protest against dropping its communist identity.

Certainly, the new party did not look like a communist one, for it seemed not to care for such doctrines as Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, democratic centralism and the like. Programmatic changes, touching sensitive foreign and domestic policy issues for a left- wing party, provided evidence of a new course. However, from a broader political perspective, dropping communist nomenclature and identity removed a substantial obstacle to better relations with the KKE and rapidly led to rapprochement. In the end, electoral stagnation for so many years and rather faint hopes of doing better in the 1989 elections decided the issue in favour of taking the road towards cooperation with the KKE. The December 1988 ‘agreement on principles’ was a compromise negotiated with the KKE under the imperatives of the approaching electoral contest.

The KKE, for its part, held its twelfth party congress, attended by 587 delegates in May 1987.14 Kharilaos Florakis was re-elected as general secretary after delivering a ninety-page report to the faithful. Some discordant voices were heard and rather reluctantly tolerated but, generally speaking, no coherent opposition to the dominant party-views emerged. Some cosmetic changes apart, no significant organisational and programmatic departure from entrenched orthodoxies was observable. The KKE continued to cherish all the ingredients of a traditional communist party, still ideologically committed to a highly improbable political project, whose realisation would turn Greece into an improved version of a ‘people’s democracy’ at best.

Policies were to be pursued through rigid ‘class politics’ domestically and by ‘two-camp’ attitudes in foreign affairs. This twin-track mentality informed policies and dictated party positions on crucial issues. However, these permanent features did not deprive the party of the possibility of developing tactical flexibility and an acute ability to sense the winds of change in the political scene. Florakis, although on record as saying that the word ‘renewal’ sent shivers down his spine, was keen to seek a coalition with other left-wing forces and thus to break the monopoly of power enjoyed by the two main political parties. He wanted to change the rules of the game by introducing the left as a third, regulating factor, holding the balance between the two main parties.

Papandreou did not miss the message. He rejected the KKE’s proposal for a ‘power coalition of left-wing forces for change in a socialist direction’ as a relic of an antiquated ‘popular frontist’ mentality.15 He accused the KKE of forming a ‘tactical alliance’ with his adversaries, namely the ‘right’ and the ‘reactionary forces’, and of making PASOK its first political target. He called for a substantial ideological and political confrontation between the two parties, while leaving the door open for cooperation on other levels.

FROM ISOLATION TO GOVERNMENT

The general elections of 18 June 1989 produced few surprises for those who had carefully studied the new electoral law and who had examined opinion polls with even greater care. PASOK’s share of the vote fell to 39.2 per cent (125 seats), Nea Dimokratia’s share rose to 44.3 per cent (145 seats), while the Synaspismos managed to win 13.1 per cent of the vote (28 seats), thus holding the balance of power. It was obvious that the bone of contention was the Synaspismos, which during consultations between political leaders to form a government, kept its cards very close to its chest. Florakis, the president of the Synaspismos and Leonidas Kyrkos, its general secretary, conducted the negotiations skilfully and played a key role in decision-making. After two weeks of horse-trading, a conservative-leftist coalition government was formed, designed to carry out a programme of catharsis, or purging of the financial and administrative irregularities allegedly perpetrated by PASOK while in power. To understand why the Synaspismos opted for cooperation with Nea Dimokratia and rejected a highly generous offer by PASOK of nine ministries and a long-term relationship in government, one has to take into account not only an accumulated resentment against PASOK, on account of the latter’s complacency, arrogance, authoritarian practices, and monopoly of power and the fact that PASOK was steadily eating into the left’s electoral clientele and stealing its ideological clothes, but also other factors. The issue of catharsis was made central to the political and moral debate, and the cleaning-up in public life of corruption acquired a quite dramatic political dimension.

Nevertheless, moral questions apart, the Synaspismos saw it as a golden opportunity to cripple PASOK before the next elections, which had been promised for the autumn. A 25-member cabinet was sworn in under Tzannis Tzannetakis, a Nea Dimokratia backbencher, widely known and respected for his resistance credentials against the military regime (1967-74) when he was a naval officer. Four significant ministries were assigned to the Synaspismos: those of interior, justice, labour and culture. None of those nominated as ministers by the Synaspismos were members of the KKE.

It was agreed from the outset by the two parties to the coalition that, as soon as parliamentary procedures were completed with regard to the investigation into, and determination of, the culpability of PASOK political figures and the setting-up of a special tribunal, new elections should be held. For there was little else that the two parties had in common. They were miles apart on all other issues, including, of course, the economy. Thus crucial decisions were postponed. In the event, parliament referred three basic cases of alleged offences by former PASOK ministers to a special tribunal: the ‘Koskotas affair’; a case involving a PASOK minister and a state-owned company, and allegations of phone-tapping. Papandreou himself was one of those referred to the tribunal. He was subsequently acquitted. The coalition government can also be credited with bringing about reconciliation between left and right for the first time since the civil war, and with initiating certain institutional changes. However, its specific mission and short term of office do not invite any comprehensive judgement on its overall performance.

Meanwhile PASOK fought back with considerable stamina, aiming exclusively at the vulnerable electoral basis of the KKE, particularly that section with the most sensitive anti-rightist reflexes. The leaders of the Synaspismos, under fire, sought to justify their decision to join the coalition, to their puzzled supporters and voters. They were clearly on the defensive and had grossly miscalculated PASOK’s solid electoral support and resilience. It was obvious that the votes won by PASOK in the European elections held simultaneously on 18 June (35.9 per cent as in the national election) represented the bottom line of its electoral appeal.16 At the same time the Synaspismos share of the vote was only slightly higher at 14.3 per cent than that in the national elections. The Synaspismos possessed neither the ideological nor the political means to make serious inroads against PASOK. It was soon realised that its expectations were unfounded and unrealistic.

In the November 1989 elections, the left’s share of the vote dropped to 11.2 per cent whereas PASOK increased its share to 40.8 per cent, basically at the expense of the left, and claimed ‘a moral and political victory’. Nea Dimokratia) despite winning 46.2 per cent of the vote and 148 seats, was still unable to form a government. This time the left’s choice was rather easier since it was clear that the first party (that is, Nea Dimokratia) could not be excluded from government. Eventually, an ‘ecumenical’ government, under Xenophon Zolotas, a retired banker, was formed with all-party support. This lasted for some months, until the next elections, those of April 1990. This time Nea Dimokratia achieved 46.9 per cent of the vote and 150 seats, still one short of an absolute majority in parliament. The deputy of a Nea Dimokratia splinter-group, Dimokratiki Ananeosi, was quick to declare his support for Nea Dimokratia, enabling a government to be formed. It is significant to note that the Synaspismos, having failed to shake PASOK, and unable to find common ground with Nea Dimokratia, was gradually drifting towards cooperation with PASOK. In the April 1990 elections, the two parties joined forces in the five single-member electoral constituencies in an effort to defeat Nea Dimokratia candidates and deprive it of an overall majority. They almost succeeded. At the end of the day, the left was back within PASOK’s fold and strategic parameters, unable to articulate its own political discourse or to devise new autonomous strategies, tactics and policies. Particularly for the KKE, the devastating blow of the communist collapse in Eastern Europe had not only taken its electoral toll, but had also shaken the party to its foundations.

CONCLUSION

Certain conclusions can be drawn about the state of the left as the country entered the last decade of this century, with a conservative government in power after eight years of socialist experimentation and two years of political instability.

  1. PASOK has suffered three successive electoral defeats. Yet it commands the loyalties of a substantial part of the electorate, and remains the major opposition party. It is still not in good shape to conduct an effective opposition and present itself convincingly as an alternative party of government. Many reforms are needed to steer the party towards modernisation of its structures and policies. A substantial part of its electoral base has left-totalitarian, quasi-fascist leanings. These are reflected in the outlets of the media group, Avriani, which has vocal supporters both in the party apparatus, in the parliamentary group, and in the top policy- and decision-making body (the executive bureau).
  2. The Synaspismos is unlikely to survive as it is, barring the emergence of a deus ex machina which might save it. This is due to the fact that the major component of the Synaspismos, the KKE, is still controlled by diehard Stalinists and unreformed communists. The communist left suffers from real electoral stagnation and political decline. Its only political option now is to seek cooperation with PASOK, hoping to share power at some point in the future. Naturally, everything depends critically on electoral performance.
  3. As a whole, the left lost considerable ideological and electoral ground over the past decade. But it still constitutes a significant force to be reckoned with, commanding almost 50 per cent of the electorate, a figure unique in the present European context.
  4. On the policy level one may note a more realistic approach on the part of both parties to some domestic issues. A certain evolution of policy and a rather slow adaptation is under way. There are still considerable policy differences between the two parties but a policy of convergence is gaining ground. However, the more such a convergence becomes possible the more likely it is to fan antagonism, because each party naturally wishes to preserve its own electoral constituency and demarcation-lines intact. Still the Synaspismos electoral basis remains the more vulnerable.
  5. Today it is more than clear that both parties lack any conception of the strategic moves necessary to win back voters. They both expect to profit from mistakes of the government, its natural attrition, and the expected reaction to the strict and painful austerity economic measures applied by Nea Dimokratia. There is no alternative vision of society to propagate against the existing model. Back in 1981, when PASOK assumed power, the rays of its logo, the ‘Green Sun’, spilled all over the left of the political spectrum with high aspirations and expectations. Eight years later, the overall picture should be considered as negative despite some positive achievements. The socialist project failed and the experiment in social engineering has left the country in ruins: economically, socially, morally and politically. Both PASOK and the communist left are reluctant to recognise their own responsibilities for such a spectacular reverse.

The verdict of the electorate in April 1990 elections entrusted Nea Dimokratia with picking up the pieces and administering bitter medicine. It still remains to be seen whether it will rise to the challenge and at what cost. If the price is right then the immediate prospects of the left’s comeback are rather bleak. If not, the way will be wide open for a variety of political scenarios.

NOTES

  1. See Richard Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece: The search for legitimacy (London, 1987).
  2. On PASOK, see among others, Vasilis Kapetanyannis, ‘I politiki kai theoritiki simasia tis syzitisis gia to PASOK’, in P. Papasarantopoulos (ed.), PASOK kai Exousia (Thessaloniki 1980), pp. 295-323. See also Vasilis Kapetanyannis, ‘Laikismos: synoptikes simeioseis yia mia kritiki epanexetasi’, Politis, 71, January-March 1986; ‘PASOK: giati 39.15%?’ in Epikentra, 58, Special Issue on the June 1989 elections, and ‘PASOK: sti dini ton antifaseon’ Epikentra, 62, Special Issue on the April 1990 elections.
  3. See Christos Lyrintzis, ‘Between socialism and populism: the rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’, PhD. dissertation, University of London, LSE, 1984; also George Mavrogordatos, The Rise of the Green Sun, Centre for Contemporary Greek Studies, King’s College, 1983.
  4. See C. Lyrintzis, ‘PASOK in power: the loss of the third road to socialism’ in Tom Gallagher and Allan M. Williams (eds), Southern European Socialism (Manchester, 1989), pp. 34-54.
  5. On the failure of PASOK to reach its (radical) potential and to fulfill its promises, from a leftist point of view, see Michalis_Spourdalakis, The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party (London, 1988).
  6. Greece: Country Report 1990, The Economist Intelligence Unit.
  7. See J. Petras, ‘PASOK in Power’, New Left Review, 163, May-June 1987, pp. 3-25.
  8. Couloumbis and P, Yannas, ‘The stability quotient of Greece’s post-1974 democratic institutions’, Journal of Modem Greek Studies (1983), pp. 359-72.
  9. Ten years later, Papandreou stated: ‘today nobody questions the right choice for our country in becoming a full member of the EC’, Kathimerini, 1 January 1991.
  10. See B. Kapetanyannis, ‘The making of Greek Euro-communism’, The Political Quarterly (1979), pp. 445-60.
  11. Mouzelis, On the Greek elections’, New Left Review, 108, April 1978, pp. 59-74.
  12. Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece, op. cit, p. 97.
  13. Kapetanyannis, ‘The communists’ in K. Featherstone and D. Katsoudas (eds), Political Change in Greece: Before and after the Colonels (London, 1987), pp. 145-73
  14. About 80 foreign delegates representing various parties and movements attended the Congress. The organisers classified party delegates by sex (men 88 per cent, women 11 per cent); by age (up to 30 years 8 per cent, 31-40 59 per cent, 41-50 14 per cent, 51-60 5 per cent and 61 and over 15 per cent); by party age (before 1940 4 per cent, 1941-50 12 per cent, 1951-67 7 per cent, 1968-74 20 per cent and 1974-82 57 per cent); by occupation (wage-earners 53 per cent, agriculture 6 per cent, self-employed 10 per cent, intellectuals 26 per cent, and not working 6 per cent), and by educational qualifications (primary 11 per cent, secondary 42 per cent, students 4 per cent, university graduates 38 per cent, technical school graduates 4 per cent). Delegates had served 1136 years in prison as political detainees. Sixteen per cent had participated in the resistance against the Nazis (1941-44) and 7 per cent in the civil war (1946-49) as members of the communist ‘Democratic Army’.
  15. In his address to PASOK’s parliamentary group, 11 June 1987.
  16. See V. Kapetanyannis, ‘PASOK giati 39.15%?’, Epiken 58, 1989.

Greece, 1981-89 The Populist Decade
Richard Clogg
Palgrave Macmillan

ISBN-13: 978-1349230563
ISBN-10: 1349230561

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