It probably is a coincidence that two hundred years after the completion and publication of Gibbon’s monumental History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire a somewhat similar work is causing profound speculation in American society and. to a lesser extent, in Europe. The book in question is the massive (678 pages) Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, by Paul Kennedy. Yale’s British Professor of the History of International Relations, which bears the characteristic subtitle ‘Economic Change and Military Conflict 1500-2000’.
Gibbon argued that fate dooms cities and whole empires to a common grave, and that all things human are destined to decline if they do not advance (empires appear to reach a power barrier at which self-satisfaction is converted into repulsive high-handedness at the expense of ‘barbarians’). What new interpretations of the crucial parameters of history has Kennedy offered to cause such interest? What are the decisive forces which mould but also erode the state force and authority of the Great Powers of our planet so as to make it appear that they follow the biological cycle of the vigour and inevitable death of an organism? What unique combination of more permanent factors raises and establishes the Great Powers in the international political constellation?
Kennedy argues that in the final analysis the position of states in the international system is determined by the possession and mobilisation of their economic forces, which are the real source of military power. They reach the apogee of their strength and dominance when they manage to control and exploit properly greater economic and technological resources than other, opposing, powers (power and wealth are always relative terms). This foundation in material resources is also the decisive factor in international conflict and confrontation. Victory usually goes to the power whose material base is larger and better organised. Yet the mere conquest of superiority makes so many demands on those resources as to undermine the power of the victorious state. Economic superiority is irretrievably bound up with extensive commitments of a military nature round the globe. In this way the great powers are trapped on a level of counter-productive military spending which, in effect, erodes their economic foundations, given that the economic mechanism is not capable of producing enough wealth to support the extension and consolidation of their strategic and military obligation and targets. This dilemma has been unresolved since Classical times. Decline is inevitable and comes about naturally, with more or less the certainty of a physical phenomenon.
The duration of historical time in which Kennedy has set his analysis, in an attempt to capture the overall historical picture, the patterns which repeat themselves and the traces they leave on international history, give his work a deterministic and structuralist dimension. The author does not of course, deny the role and influence of special factors (chance, for instance, or personality), but he places them within a framework of more general structural forces. He appears to believe that in the end the decisions of kings and generals, ideologies and leaders, are not of very great importance. The protagonists of history are not individuals or institutions but the great impersonal forces – and of those forces the material ones are those which play the dominant, decisive part.
Kennedy’s basic hypothesis, that change in power relations is endemic and inevitable in the international system, underlies his diagnosis of the current power position of America and the Soviet Union and also his extrapolation of predictions into the future. Although he does not believe that history’ provides us with a specific map of the future, he does appear to adopt the view that the study of the past is something more than a mere academic or aesthetic exercise. It is more true to say that it provides us with a medium for seeing current problems more clearly and making us reserved and careful to the necessary degree. Kennedy does not hesitate to make predictions about the future, the more distant future, the coming century in which the inevitable alterations of power will have changed the scene as we know’ it today.
America and the Soviet Union cannot hope to be able to hold their present positions. The bipolar system will give way to a multi-polar one, in which the two superpowers of the present will co-exist with China, Japan and Europe. Consistent in his analysis, Kennedy clearly states his view that America has ceased to be a great power, or at least to be as great as it was a generation ago. This leading position has been finally and irrevocably lost1.
The privileges which the United States enjoyed during all that period were, to a large extent, artificial, the result of the destruction undergone by the economies of the European countries during the Second World War. As other powers rise, so the United States will inevitably experience relative decline. Kennedy is quite clear and uncompromising: the current power position cannot be maintained. All that is left is management of the downward course in such a way as to keep the country among the Great Powers of the future, even with reduced strength, since the country’ continues to have considerable resources. A necessary condition for correct management is recognition and admission of the limits and circumstances of American power.
Does the case of America fit into the decline model? Was it the fear of such a downward path that made American public opinion willing to accept political and ideological dogmas of all kinds which proclaimed that America could become ‘great again’?2 Could it have been a wave of collective subconscious reaction which helped Reagan’s rise to the Presidency? Or is the fall the result less of a lack of sufficient wealth than of a growing unwillingness among the leading classes of the country’ to shoulder the burdens involved in undertaking military’ responsibilities and commitments on a global scale. Can the tax reductions of the neo-liberal doctrine be reconciled with maintaining a high level of military’ spending and serving world strategic interests?3
Kennedy appears to be firmly convinced that the productive capacity of the economy is the decisive factor. In a review of a report4 by the American ‘wise men’ on the long-term strategic policy’ of the United States, published in the current issue of the ‘New York Review of Books’, Kennedy distinguishes between “military’ politics”, in which category, with regret, he classifies Europe, and overall, integrated “military planning”, which takes into account all the co-ordinates of military power. He points out that America produces fewer engineers than Japan, which has half its population, that only 40% of the doctoral degrees awarded by American universities go to American nationals, and that in general America lags behind Japan in highly-specialised technical and scientific personnel. That is why he is sounding the alarm. In the case of the Soviet Union, Kennedy says that the position of “the last real imperialist empire”, as he calls it, is even more critical because its ratio of economy to military is even less favourable5.
One cannot rule out the possibility that Kennedy’s book may soon be numbered among the great works of history, such as those of Ranke,6 the great German historian of the 19th century, of Toynbee or of Gibbon. Nor would it be wrong to set it at directly the opposite pole to the work of Spengler7. As we have seen in this review, Kennedy, unlike Spengler, who concerned himself with comparative cultural morphology in what was in effect a new version of the classical cyclical theory of history, stresses principally the impersonal forces of history.
It seems unlikely that today’s political leaders of the Great Powers or their staffs will be willing to looks far into the future. And we can be almost sure that these military concerns and plans will not go very far into the structure of day-to-day political combat and conflict. However, if Kennedy’s book helps create an awareness of the objective and structural limitations of power, then perhaps the exercise of that power will become more reasoned, more sparing and more thoughtful. That, of course, would be equivalent to a demand for a high level of national self-consciousness and responsibilities, particularly towards those who experience the consequences of the superiority and military dominance of the United States.
Notes
- In 1945, for example, the United States represented 45% of the world’s economy. Today the figure is not greater than 20%. In 1945 the United States held more than 2/3 of the world’s gold reserves: in 1973 the share was only 1/3, during the period 1948-73 the American economy grew at an average rate of 3.7% per annum; in 1973-86 the rate was only 2.4%.
- Jacques Renard observed in a recent issue of ‘L’Express Internationale’ (May 6. 1988) that Kennedy’s book touched a “raw nerve” in America, particularly when the country was in the run-up to elections. The more conservative wing of the Republican Party is firmly attached to the idea of an America which is “confident and dominant”, while denouncing the ‘defeatism’ of those who recommend more unpalatable recipes.
- It is characteristic that in the early 1970s the USA had more than a million troops in 30 countries, was a member of four peripheral alliances, had signed defence co-operation agreements with 42 countries, supplied economic and military aid to 100 countries and was a member of 53 international organisations.
- The report, entitled ‘Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy’, was drawn up by leading authorities on strategic and international affairs, including Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Albert Wohlsetter. The report took 15 months to write and its publication produced considerable controversy.
- See interview granted to Philippe Romon in ‘Le Nouvel Observateur’, April 22-28,1988.
- Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), regarded as one of the pioneers of modern historical method.
- Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), German philosopher of history, best known for his ‘Decline of the West’ (1919-22).