Greek Communists: Dilemmas and Opportunities Following the Local Elections

The results of the local elections in Greece, held in two rounds on 12 and 19 October 1986, showed swings of varying degrees against the ruling Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, the chief beneficiary being the main opposition party, New Democracy (ND). The hitherto ailing conservative opposition, shaken by defections and tom by internal dissent after three successive electoral defeats (in general elections in 1981 and 1985, and in European elections in 1984), made a rather unexpected political recovery by seizing control of the three most important cities, Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki, from incumbent socialist mayors.

Although New Democracy’s success cannot be disregarded, its overall impact on the political climate remains very doubtful. In the first place, real first-round gains for ND in these cities as compared with the 1985 general election results averaged no more than 2.5 per cent of the total vote. Second, it is not yet clear whether these voting swings represent permanent shifts of opinion or protest votes against the government that can somehow be regained. It is widely accepted though that voters were clearly not enamoured of many of the government’s policies, particularly the economic stabilization programme introduced in October 1985, and took the opportunity to register strongly their disaffection.

Against this background the Communists sought to capitalise on what appeared to be a growing mood of discontent amongst P OK followers. Both of Greek Communists: Dilemmas and Opportunities Following the Local Elections the communist parties – the larger, pro-Moscow Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the small Eurocommunist KKE interior (KKE int.) – had lost ground to PASOK in the June 1985 general election and now wanted to achieve a better performance. In this respect the KKE has undoubtedly succeeded in showing its teeth, although it can derive little comfort from the fact that its ‘broad left’ candidates in the three major cities mentioned above did less well than its own party candidates did in the 1982 local elections. However, whereas the KKE int. just managed to hold its position compared with the 1982 local elections, the KKE, showing greater tactical flexibility, increased its share of the municipalities by ten (53 out of a total of 303 as against 43 held since 1982). The fact that local elections do not decide the complexion of the government sufficiently explains this voting pattern, which is not inconsistent with most post-war local electoral contests.

What actually came as a surprise, although not to some observers, was the failure of the KKE to lend tactical support to PASOK-backed candidates in the run-off elections (held between the two leading candidates when none achieves an absolute majority in the first round). After the first round, the government refused to concede the KKE’s demand for the introduction of simple proportional representation in national elections (which would of course give the Communists a greater voice and might even allow them to hold the balance of power in a hung parliament). In response the KKE instructed its supporters to ‘teach PASOK a lesson’ by showing their opposition to the government in Athens, politically the most important city, ‘in any way they deem fit’. The effect of this instruction undoubtedly spilled over to other municipalities as well, where PASOK-backed candidates failed to attract the entire communist vote in the second round as they might have expected to do automatically on the basis of past ‘voting habits’. It was this tactical voting by the Communists that, technically speaking, allowed the Conservatives to seize control of the three major cities. On the other hand, in a gesture of courteous reciprocity, conservative voters showed a rather distinct preference for their otherwise arch-enemies and supported KKE candidates where the latter stood against the PASOK-backed ones in the second round. They even preferred them to the Eurocommunists! The remarkable decision of the KKE to break with past practice has put its relation with the ruling Socialists on an entirely new basis. The message to PASOK was clear: the KKE should not be taken for granted; support from this quarter is not going to be unconditional.

It should be recalled that PASOK was able to win a sweeping victory at the polls in 1981 and to assume power by riding the waves of radicalism dating from the early 1960s and the resistance movement that developed during the years of the military dictatorship (1967-74). PASOK won a second term in office in the June 1985 general election by winning 46 per cent of the vote – an amazingly small erosion of just two per cent relative to the 1981 percentage – thanks to the conditioned anti-rightist reflexes of the left-wing constituency which, naturally enough, prefers any credible alternative to the Right. In both these electoral contests, as well as in the European elections of 1984, both communist parties failed to make any political capital out of this radicalism, and any significant electoral advances. In fact, their combined vote in 1985 was no higher than that scored 50 years ago. In other words, the basic political cleavage between the Right and the anti-rightist camp has clearly favoured PASOK at the expense of the Communists, who encouraged rather than discouraged such a distinction.

While the KKE enjoys much greater influence in the trade union movement, higher education and the mass media than is reflected in its vole, the left-wing electoral constituency has remained loyal to PASOK, and for good reasons. The government has not only substantially improved the incomes of the lowest paid, spent generously on fanners and invested heavily in public works for the provinces, but also has healed civil war wounds by taking a series of national reconciliation measures and giving the Resistance generation social recognition and political justification.

During PASOK’s first term in office (1981-85) the KKE adopted a ‘constructive’ approach towards the government. Despite the hidden antagonism both parties co-operated and shared power in many areas, particularly in trade unions, student unions and local government. Relations between the two parties were strained during the election period of 1985 when the KKE conducted a vigorous campaign in an effort to limit its expected electoral losses. They further deteriorated because of the new package of strict economic measures (including a two-year wage freeze) introduced in October 1985. The KKE leadership sought to profit from the commotion within the ruling party, particularly among ‘left- wing radical’ trade unionists. It was behind the strike wave that hit the country in the following months.

Has the time now come for the KKE to follow a more independent line and break its special relationship with PASOK? Will such tactics win the party more votes in a general election? Many Communists heralded the municipal ‘deviation’ of a strong anti-PASOK stance as an act of self-emancipation. Communists had to stand on their feet by getting rid, albeit belatedly, of their ‘anti-rightist syndrome’, or so the argument went. Whatever the case, it is clear for the moment that the KKE’s leadership now wants to distance itself from PASOK as much as possible in order to recover the lost ground. Attacks on the government’s domestic and foreign policies are being increasingly intensified. If the KKE were to attract enough disillusioned PASOK voters to deprive the latter of a working majority in the next parliament, then it might be possible either to dictate terms behind the scenes or even to be invited to participate in a coalition government as a junior partner, as in the case of the first Mitterrand government in France. Much depends of course on the electoral system. A shift to a purer form of proportional representation, an idea that is being canvassed even among conservatives, might leave PASOK with no clear majority. However, conditions of acute political polarization around the two major parties could well squeeze further the KKE’s electoral appeal. And it is equally possible that a situation in which no party commanded an absolute majority in parliament would not necessarily lead to a PASOK-KKE coalition. Many other possibilities of forming a government with the participation of other small left-wing and moderate conservative groups or even a grand coalition between PASOK and New Democracy cannot be excluded a priori. That is why Costas Mitsotakis, New Democracy’s leader, while trying to build bridges between his party and the Communists, is totally against any change of the present electoral system of reinforced proportional representation that gives him a fair and fighting chance to win.

With the ruling PASOK party undergoing a serious crisis of identity and adjustment, and the government’s popularity seemingly at a low ebb because of continuing economic hardship, the KKE has an opportunity to agitate and increase its influence. The crucial question is by how much, and whether that can be translated into votes. The KKJE has to weigh its desire for power against the possibility of actually facilitating a strong conservative comeback. It is ironic, of course, that the KKE usually thrives under right-wing and conservative administrations for its finds it easier then to justify its policies. On the other hand the more the conservatives abandon their sterile anti-communism, the easier it will become to concentrate on real political and economic issues in relation to which the KKE has very little to offer apart from old-fashioned left-wing policies. Is it therefore irrelevant who governs Greece for the KKE? Ideologically and politically the KKE tried to avoid this dilemma by portraying itself as the only ‘true champion’ of the Left. But what about the voters when it comes to choosing a government?

While the KKE is certainly capable of damaging PASOK’s election chances, its own electoral appeal cannot be expected to increase dramatically. For it remains a highly orthodox Marxist—Leninist organization, faithful to Moscow to an extravagant degree, and is tightly controlled by an ageing leadership whose perspectives were shaped during the 1940s. Under the influence of the new Gorbachev leadership in the USSR some changes and adjustments can reasonably be expected at its twelfth congress in May 1987. It is reasonable also to expect an infusion of ‘new blood’ into the top party echelons or even the replacement of the party’s ‘moderate’ general secretary, Harilaos Florakis, who alternatively may well be given an honorary position and title. The image, therefore, can be polished but it is virtually inconceivable for the KKE to change its vision of society, tailored to the Soviet model, and its strict adherence to the fundamental tenets of proletarian internationalism — by which is meant being subservient to Moscow’s dicta.

On the other hand the small Eurocommunist party is once more at a crossroads. Its rather poor showing in the local elections exacerbated its identity crisis and created further confusion concerning its political stance. The party, leading a rather marginal political life 18 whole years after the split in the KKE in 1968, has been engaged in a protracted public debate on its own future. At its fourth congress (10-17 May 1986) it dropped the terms ‘proletarian internationalism’ and ‘democratic centralism’ and allowed all currents of opinion within the party to be expressed proportionally in its decision-making bodies. Above all the congress decided by a narrow majority to convene a new congress in March 1987 in order to found a new party of the Broad Socialist Left, a political formation in between PASOK and the KKE. The experiment is interesting and the party’s newly elected general secretary, Leonidas Kyrkos (its sole MP), appears to be determined to move forward despite strong opposition and challenges from within the party.

However, at this stage it is difficult to assess the viability and potential of the future broad left-type political formation. What is beyond dispute is that intercommunist rivalry has come to an end. Orthodoxy has prevailed and the KKE int. has already ceased in many ways to be a ‘typical’ communist party. So for both CPs 1987 is a crucial year that will determine not only their future course but also their relationship with PASOK. The nature of this relationship, problematic or not, will have a profound influence on the shaping of the political map of Greece in the very near future. But a broader question now hangs over both PASOK and the Communists. Has the radical tide subsided? Is it possible to revive the socialist project and at what political cost for the parties themselves and the country as a whole? Or is it high lime there was a redefinition of what the ‘Left’ should stand for on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues? Here is a terrain on which a variety of left-wing opinion will inevitably and fiercely clash, and on which most probably a realignment of the Greek Left, communist and non-communist, will take place. But this may take some considerable time to come.