In the debate about Eurocommunism, little attention has been paid to the fortunes of the Greek Eurocommunists. Yet the Greek example highlights some of the difficulties of Eurocommunism and the problems involved in restructuring and reforming along democratic lines a European movement which has been and in some instances still is so firmly entrenched in Stalinist traditions. Obvious Greek Eurocommunism has been the least discussed because of its limited political influence. Nonetheless, there is much that is significant as well as striking in the evasive, hesitant and ambiguous attitudes of the main Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe towards their Greek counterpart, with the notable exception of the Spanish Communist Party.
It is now more than 10 years, February 1968 to be precise, since the once united Communist Party of Greece (hereafter called the KKE) split into two separate parties at the 12th Plenary Session of its Central Committee which took place abroad. There emerged the Moscow-orientated KKE, the so-called Communist Party of the Exterior (hereafter KKEext.) and KKE of the Interior (hereafter KKEint.) which gradually followed a Eurocommunist road. Since then, while KKEext. has prospered electorally the KKEint. is still struggling for survival. To understand why, it is necessary to consider, however briefly, the Greek Communist movement in its full social and political context and in its relation to the international Communist movement.
The Schism
The 12th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of KKE was convened on February 1968 under the most difficult circumstances. The military coup of April 1967 had crushed the forces of the Left for a second time within a period of less than 20 years. It might have seemed natural for any party to start questioning its strategic assumptions and policies, in relation to the conditions which preceded the coup and the defeat of democratic forces in Greece. Nothing of the sort happened. Instead, the then leader of the party produced out of his sleeve a letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stating explicitly that KKE’s policies had so far been correct. Pre-empted by such a supreme authority, any further discussion was pointless.
This event, by no means unique in the history of the party, illustrates the first major long-term factor which eventually determined the boundaries between the two parties. To say that the KKE had always been dependent on the Soviet Union may appear to state the obvious. Every West European Communist Party has passed through a similar phase; but there are some peculiarities in the Greek case which made this dependence on Moscow particularly heavy.
- The KKE, formed in 1918, was one of the first parties to affiliate to the Comintern; and because the party was torn by internal conflicts of various factions, the Comintern had from the very beginning imposed a Moscow-trained leader, a professional international revolutionary. An unexpected consequence was that the KKE had to accept under Comintern pressure a policy of an “autonomous Macedonia ”. Although this policy was dropped later, its revival during the civil war resulted in many communists facing the firing squad as traitors to their country.
- In October 1944 Churchill and Stalin concluded the well- known carve-up of the Balkans into spheres of influence. The British having a free hand in Greece succeeded in checking the Left by direct armed intervention. The KKE policies at that time were contradictory and vacillating and because of its preoccupation to “ interpret correctly ” the Soviet interests. One of the most powerful Resistance movements in Europe was brought to its knees because of the fatal mistakes of the KKE leadership. And some time later the KKE was once more trapped by committing itself to a full-scale civil war.
- During the civil war (1946-49) the Greek Communist movement suffered a devastating political and military defeat. The KKE virtually ceased to exist inside the country and its leadership as well as most of the remnants of the guerrilla army took refuge abroad, mainly in the Soviet Union. Yet the leaders of the party, politically bankrupt and responsible for many purges, managed not only to survive but to tighten their grip on the party by silencing the few remaining discordant voices. Scapegoats were easily found in order to account for the crushing defeat which was presented to the party militants as a “tactical withdrawal”. Party members were told to keep their weapons well-oiled since the situation in Greece was “revolutionary. It was probably thought that by creating the illusion that you control reality, you actually can control it, as in primitive magic.
- The KKE was thus so Stalinist that, while the shock waves of the 20th Congress of the CPSU marked the beginning of a slow process of “de-Stalinisation” in many West European Communist Parties, it proved impossible for changes to occur within the KKE. A committee was set up from “fraternal parties” to help the KKE to become more in tune with the new Soviet piper. These changes resulted in violent clashes in some refugee settlements and massive expulsions of party members faithful to the old Stalinist leadership. At the same time, new leaders, drawn from the same ranks as the old but more willing now to play the game, were installed at the top. The 6th Plenary Session of a renewed Central Committee was staged and “unanimously” legitimised the new order. But in reality, de- Stalinisation never got off the ground.
Instances of this type cannot, of course, be a substitute for deeper analysis. Nevertheless, they provide a rough picture of the ground on which subsequent important issues were to be fought. The dividing lines between the two party factions as far as independence, autonomy, non-interference, etc., were concerned, were then neither as clear nor as crystallised as they are today. Other factors forced the final confrontation on matters of principle. The main one was to be the inherited dictum that unquestionable loyalty to the Soviet Union was indispensable to a real communist. Two other factors were of importance: the question of leadership (which was closely interconnected to the problem of inner-party democracy) and the question of the political tactics.
The United Democratic Left
There came to be a dualism of leadership functions. As early as 1952, a party called the United Democratic Left (EDA) was formed which soon became the rallying point of Left-wing forces in Greece including Communists. From being a simple electoral device, EDA gradually developed into a well-organised party. Against strong odds in the 1958 General Election EDA polled 25 per cent, of the total vote and with 79 seats became the major opposition party in Parliament. By then the Communist element within EDA had become predominant. The majority of EDA leaders were Communists and among them a group called the “Interior Office” of the Central Committee was in charge of executing KKE’s policies. But appointments to key posts within EDA were submitted for approval to the KKE leadership in exile.
This raised questions of tactics. Despite the legal restrictions of Communism, EDA was increasingly becoming a predominantly united Marxist party, a unique and experimental phenomenon in the European political scene, given the usual divisions between Communist, Socialist and Social-Democratic parties. The exiled leaders of the KKE were caught off balance and it was only after 1965 that they finally made a deliberate move to organise communist cells within EDA. The KKE leaders in exile felt that if they allowed EDA to develop its own political potential and the “interior” leaders to take on political functions and decision-making powers, they might sooner or later find themselves redundant. As a matter of fact conflicts of this kind were already taking place as a result of claims that the KKE leaders abroad had lost touch with reality. Thus, by making this move the “exteriors” sought deliberately to consolidate their position in practice by dividing the militants into two classes: the chosen first-class Communists and outcast second-class EDAists. Revolutionary “purity” was well preserved for KKE.
EDA’s programme had a “modest” goal: the overthrow of the existing social and political regime by a system of social alliances comprising the middle social strata and their political representatives, as had been the tactic of many Western European CPs after 1956. Once the strategic goal of the EDA, that is to say the “ antiimperialist anti-monopolist revolution ”, had been accomplished, the KKE would step in and take over to implement its own “ maximum ” programme of “ socialism ” based on the “ dictatorship of the proletariat ” and the like. It is not surprising then that the leaders of EDA came under fire from the KKE leaders who, apparently impressed by the extent of popular mobilisation and the rapid radicalisation of greater sectors of society, accused the “interiors” of not seizing the opportunity to launch the final assault on the Greek Winter Palace. And all this took place around the time of 1963 when the combined opposition forces were to bring about the downfall of the Right-wing government.
During the 1960s, Greece experienced unprecedented economic and social change. But soon the consequences of a capitalist economic development started to rebound on the repressive regime. Expectations were rising, social problems accumulating, new social forces were entering the political arena, political consciousness and a spirit of militancy among workers, peasants, students, professional middle classes, even civil servants grew at a threatening pace. Yet although the Left played an active role in every single popular protest, it failed to reap the expected political benefits. It was badly equipped theoretically both to comprehend and to deal with the new situation, and when democracy was at stake, in the protracted crisis of 1965-67, it failed once more to come to grips with essentials. Totally disorientated, it undoubtedly contributed to the collapse of the democratic forces as a whole.
During this period the seeds of Greek Eurocommunism were sown. The Left, after all, had had to solve the day-to-day problems by itself. The organisation of the EDA was looser, discussions freer, and above all participation in the struggles for the defence of basic democratic rights led many party militants to value democracy as a principle, not just as a devilish device for class rule. Moreover, the “interiors” were exposed to the changing winds of Greek society and also to Western Marxist ideas, which played a fundamental role in reorientating and reshaping the ideology of a whole generation of intellectuals. EDA, in 1964, went as far as to denounce an opportunist about-turn in Soviet foreign policy on Cyprus and a group of EDA intellectuals condemned publicly the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union.
Yet this was not a dramatic break with the past. There had not yet emerged any coherent set of new ideas, any alternative system of strategic assumptions, any clear-cut democratic premises. There rather existed an empirical approach to practical political problems, a rather hazy conception of the kind of politics needed for the advance of the Greek Communist movement to enable it to stand on its own feet and break the chain of successive defeats. Political necessities made the defence of democratic institutions a top priority and thus contributed immensely to a process of gradual erosion of old values and loyalties, to the emergence of a new orientation and to a new commitment to the democratisation of all spheres of party and political activities. The two basic components of Greek Eurocommunism, party autonomy and independence from foreign centres and democratic political practice, are certainly rooted in the political experiences of this period. And last but not least, a fundamental lesson of politics previously unknown to the Greek Communists was finally learned at least by some of them: that politics is also the art of compromise at the right moment.
The Widening Gap
In 1968, “interior” leaders were threatened with expulsion and political extinction. They had either to shut up or to fight tooth and nail for their political survival, that is either to kneel down or to break the Party. Not an easy decision to be taken since they were still haunted by the spectre of excommunication. Some critics of the Left maintain even today that the interior leaders’ move was “historically premature”. In fact, it came too late for had they had the courage to make the break earlier they could not have been deprived of their most valuable weapon, that is to convey their message directly to their supporters inside Greece under conditions of legal and free political activity. Having lost this opportunity, they thus lacked any network of political communications and material resources. The dice were loaded in favour of their party opponents whose centralism and discipline and external aid could better sustain an underground and clandestine organisation.
The break-up of the KKE can be seen above all as the inevitable result of divisions on essential questions which had been maturing for years in the top party echelons. The party’s long tradition of Stalinist political practice, its total dependence on the Soviet Union, its very structures, led inevitably to the choice between mechanical submission to a minority on the one hand and factionalism on the other. Unfortunately, there was neither a Gramsci nor a Togliatti in the Greek Communist tradition. Even worse, a long tradition of anti-intellectualism, crude empiricism, moralising and lack of political ethos can be held responsible for the fact that a whole series of party leaders were discredited and dishonoured by their successors, usually in order to justify a new party line.
Objective difficulties were great enough without subjective shortcomings in the KKEint. leadership. For it is fair to say that from 1968 to 1974 “interior” leaders were too indecisive and hesitant. They lost precious time by parading their claims of legitimacy in the “socialist” capitals of Eastern Europe, hoping perhaps for recognition and for a last-minute reconciliation, so were slow to lay the foundations of a new party. In short, the organisational and political problems of the new party were not solved satisfactorily, that is by consensus and legitimate democratic procedures, until after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974.
Various supporters of the KKEint. were the first to overcome the initial inertia and paralysis effected by the military coup and to start organising the resistance forces for action. Even so, it took KKEint, some time to analyse correctly the nature of the military regime and its non-transitional character. Its analysis of the new situation was unsual for traditional Communist thinking and based on clear assumptions and realistic assessments. Its main features were: (i) a clear distinction between fascist and military regimes. An explicit acknowledgment that continuous economic growth and improvement in living standards were not incompatible, by definition, with a military form of government; (ii) it followed that, under the circumstances, the main political contradiction was between dictatorship and democracy (e.g. bourgeois parliamentary democracy not proletarian soviets); and (iii) an assessment that the camp of the ruling classes in their Right-wing political representation was deeply divided between pro-dictatorial and pro-parliamentary groups.
The above assumptions amounted to an invitation for a common political programme by all forces opposed to the dictatorship. The implications of pursuing such a goal were inescapable: (a) the restoration of a democratic parliamentary regime; (b) the unity of all anti-dictatorial forces irrespective of their political complexion. Given the state of disorganisation of the Left-wing resistance groups, not to speak of their divergences and rivalries, this unity could only be realised by trimming ambitious “revolutionary” schemes and establishing a common political objective, that of the return to democratic rule; and (c) the development of a united mass movement to fight for essential rights on a broad front and to sharpen contradictions within the enemy’s camp.
This strategy was not, of course, without its problems both in its conception as well as in its application. However, it must be contrasted with the strategies of the other Left-wing resistance groups and measured against the final outcome. The Panhellenic Resistance Movement (PAK) of Andreas Papandreou, for instance, would not compromise short of an armed struggle for “ national liberation ”. As for the orthodox KKEext., when it appeared on the resistance scene as an organised force around 1973, worse meant better and economic catastrophism at that very late stage of Greek capitalism would inevitably result in the victorious proletarian revolution with the assistance of the Soviet Union. Needless to say that neither ever set out to implement their respective strategies.
Settling Accounts
With the collapse of the Junta and General Elections due on November 17, 1974, the scene was set for a major confrontation between the two Communist parties. Yet KKEint. avoided this confrontation by entering an electoral coalition with the KKEext., despite strong opposition of many party members. It was self-evident that at that stage the one who had the most effective organisation was bound to gain the support of the traditional Communist voters, and KKEint. lacked even a skeleton organisation. The voters had barely noticed the existence of two separate parties and in any case they were mostly interested in knowing which party had the backing of the Soviet Union. KKEint. appealed to the ideas of democrats in general by arguing that the restoration of parliamentary democracy constituted a decisive break with the Junta regime and that all anti-junta forces should work together in order to consolidate this change and prevent any return to conditions favourable to military intervention. This policy won around 3 per cent, of the total vote. On the other hand, KKEext. devoted all its energies to wiping out KKEint. The change in government was for them nothing but a change in the form of “bourgeois rule” and the official explanation for their attitude towards the 1967 military coup was that the party was caught napping and “technically unprepared” to prevent it. It polled around 5*5 per cent, of the total vote.
Many traditional Left-wing voters deserted both parties to the newly founded Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) of Mr. A. Papandreou, who in his electoral campaign promised to bring about nothing less than socialism the next day of the election, as if socialism was a “gift” to be given to the people overnight. PASOK shared with KKEext. the view that the new regime was more or less a matter of changing one set of “ NATOist guards ” for another. However, it polled 13-6 per cent.
At the next General Elections held in November 1977 the expected confrontation between the two Communist parties was again postponed. At the expense of its newly born identity, KKEint. concealed itself behind an electoral coalition of insignificant groups, resulting in a disastrous 2-7 per cent, share of the vote—the price of its own political lack of courage. Thus in two successive electoral competitions, KKEint. had not yet presented itself to the voters in its own right. In 1977, KKEext. polled 9-4 per cent, and PASOK with 25-3 per cent, succeeding in becoming the major opposition party. This transitional period between the two General Elections proved crucial for the fortunes of Greek Eurocommunists. Their political proposition for the formation of an “ anti-dictatorial front ” lacked one fundamental prerequisite: a well-organised KKEint. Their reasoning was widely recognised and tacitly acknowledged, the party gained respect and sympathy but few votes. In a way KKEint. found itself outside the prevailing currents and mood of the Greek Left which was made to believe that socialism or radical transformations were imminent.
It took nearly five years for other opposition parties to come to terms with some basic determinant factors of the new post-Junta situation. PASOK, for instance, abandoned its maximalism by making a clear distinction between programmatic declarations and actual implementation of policies, which is a process of creating carefully the conditions to safeguard the next step. KKEint., on the other hand, had to pay the price for daring to demand dialogue and political argument, in place of wishful thinking and slogans and pointing out that if real problems were to be solved it was essential that the habitual monotonous and repetitive monologues of the Greek political parties would be thrown into the dustbin for good. So, is the game over for the Greek Eurocommunists? Are the accounts really settled between the two communist parties since the Stalinist KKEext. has gained the upper hand and can now speak from a position of strength ? A closer examination of the two parties might provide an answer.
The Orthodox KKEext.
KKEext. is a powerful and well-disciplined organisation. There are no exact figures for its membership available but it is estimated that the party employs some 1,500 professional cadres, a formidable number by any standards. According to some reports its annual budget exceeds £13 million. This powerful economic machine attracts few intellectuals, though some careerists and opportunists from mainly younger artists in search of a promotional vehicle and a large audience join the ranks of an outmoded Communist intelligentsia ideologically wrecked and politically so naive as to wait for the Soviet troops to liberate mankind.
The KKEext.’s conception of socialism is modelled on the Soviet Union. Human rights is held to be a bourgeois concept, psychiatric hospitals for treating political dissidents a bourgeois fiction. All of the traditional Kremlin doctrines are there: dictatorship of the proletariat, class against class, economic catastrophism, the doctrine of moribund capitalism and the like. Socialist ideas do not need to be organically linked with national traditions and actual working-class practices and articulated to the experiences of the Greek communist movement but must be “ paradigmatic ”, that is imported from abroad. Party publications are full of official Soviet political and other literature, though sometimes censored out of ignorance or excessive zeal. Statements by Eurocommunist parties and countries like Romania and Yugoslavia which are critical of the Soviet Union are heavily censored too. Western Marxism and developments in Marxist theory are officially non-existent. The KKEext. has an extraordinary ability to falsify and distort systematically and beyond recognition even the most self-evident facts of life. Party political education stresses discipline and obedience to authority, social and cultural conformism, behavioural uniformity, sexual morality, messianism and activism.
In the domain of foreign policy it is even harder to sort out a single issue differentiating the party from the Soviet Foreign Policy. If one dares to point out the apparent contradiction between shouting for national independence, on the one hand, and approving of the Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, on the other, the answer is that there is no contradiction because American tanks, and recently the Chinese ones, are bad, Soviet ones good. The former carry capitalism, the latter socialism. Let two examples show that this is no exaggeration:
- During the World Cup in Argentina and among rising protests against Videla’s repressive regime KKEext., following the Soviet line, argued that this was not the case and American imperialism was conspiring to overthrow the “ centrist ” Videla. One of the party’s deputies, tortured and imprisoned himself by the Greek junta, defended publicly the party line, to everybody’s shame and pity.
- Georges Marchais, the leader of the French CP, while paying a visit to Greece last February, declared that his party was opposed to any enlargement of EEC to include Greece, Spain and Portugal because that would harm French farmers’ interests but that the independence of France is best served if France stays in and keeps everybody else locked out. To this KKEext. agreed, stating that the independence of Greece and Greek farmers’ interests are best served if Greece stays out. Both parties signed a joint communique along this line of reasoning.
The KKEext., however, enjoys genuine popular support. It has the ability to put its rich resources to effective use and translate its orthodoxy into practical ideologies. It certainly could still grow. But despite any superficial changes in its policies or any flexibility in tactics, KKEext. cannot change its basic structures of dependence and commitments and thus constitutes a negative force in Greek politics. Opportunism can bring electoral fruits but it cannot provide a substitute for real change. Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Spanish Communist Party is, after all, right. The traditional Stalinist Communist Party is like the Catholic Church. Infallibility is not just a declared dogma, it must also be enforced by concrete mechanisms. Party inquisition is not only a purgatory of “false” ideas, it is also a concrete machinery of enforcement in which heresy is seen as a sin which merits excommunication, for it corrupts the Faith and sets in motion the critical properties of the mind. And these sins must be harried out of existence by the energetic zeal of party members, censure and punishment. The punishment of the party evil-doer provides the rewards of the well-doer. But did they ever think that by keeping the sins out they would make them all the more attractive?
It seems to me that religious and political dogmas are closed circuits, impenetrable by facts, inaccessible to logic, until the moment of disruption comes. But what and when? Very difficult to say indeed. One often finds it difficult to oppose reality against ideologies because the latter can be used, if properly systematised, as an instrument to appropriate reality. And though not suitable today for scientific inquiry or logical argument, yet they remain useful for political purposes, to cement the corporate pride of a religious-type community and organisation. That is what the Stalinist KKEext. is.
Eurocommunism is not only an antidote to this petrified logic, it is also a drive towards the secularisation of communist political thought.
The KKEint.: The Price of Choice
It must by now be clear that KKEint. leaders did not realise initially the dimensions of their task, the difficulties not only of creating a new social and political basis for the reform of the Greek Communist movement but also of achieving a new level of political culture, a new set of political values—at a price which would be bearable for Communists of the old guard. Only now have these constraints and limitations been openly and fully realised.
As an organisation the party is still very weak. A mere 10,000 to 12,000 members, according to some estimations, are not enough to link the party effectively with the major sectors of social and political activity and give it a national impact. Its annual budget of some £200,000 is hardly sufficient for the most elementary party functions and the party machinery seems to operate under the permanent threat of impending financial collapse. However, it has managed to survive so far and is still engaged in creating its own political space to breathe comfortably and to consolidate its position.
KKEint.’s conception of socialism has nothing to do with Soviet or East European regimes. There is no need to expand on this point. The basic tenets of a Greek road to socialism, a democratic road to socialism, do not vary appreciably from what is commonly professed among devoted Eurocommunists elsewhere. KKEint. must look to Western Marxism to draw its theoretical tools of analysis. Party publications are predominantly concerned with debates and developments in other Eurocommunist parties. The overwhelming majority of party intellectuals and those close to it are educated in the West and it is only now that major Marxist works are beginning to appear in Greece by Marxists capable of applying their knowledge creatively to analyse Greek society and politics. However, lack of basic resources makes this an individual rather than a collective or a party effort.
The Party’s inner organisation and functions as a political organism have to be measured, first, against past structures and practices. Today’s constitution is more democratic, debates are freer and minority opinions protected and officially published. Censorship is limited. Around 30 per cent, of the delegates at the Congress are directly elected from party cells, and the party leaders have to rule by consensus rather than by directives. Still, the principle of “democratic centralism” can be and has been used to suppress “deviations”. Secondly, it must be measured against the Greek political setting. A long tradition of clientage and patronage as well as the persistent fluidity of social structures do not encourage the formation of parties with stable structures and democratic inner functions. The ruling New Democracy Party is hardly a modern conservative party and is still at an early stage of organisation. PASOK is hard to separate from its leader, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, and may not survive his inevitable departure; and some small parties currently occupying the Centre of the political spectrum are little more than small groups of satellites around personalities.
While it is impossible to outline here the KKEint.’s policies on domestic issues, it is fair to say that unlike other Left-wing parties it respects majority opinion wherever it is formed by democratic procedures—as, for example, in trade unions and other associations; and in its encouragement of popular initiative and community politics. There is, however, an issue of crucial importance on which KKEint. itself came out with fresh and constructive ideas: the governance of Greece. To anybody familiar with the transition from dictatorship to parliamentary rule and the nature of the resultant regime, it must be plain how difficult it is to visualise a peaceful succession of parties in power. Few people would argue with assurance that democracy is doing well and is guaranteed. On the contrary, as things now stand many Greeks of all political creeds consider it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Greek military establishment to accept, for instance, a PASOK government by PASOK if the latter win the next elections. Undemocratic reactions could set in quickly. This reasoning helps to explain why a vast number of Greeks continue to regard the presence of the present Prime Minister Mr. Karamanlis on the political scene more or less as the guarantor for normal, peaceful, democratic evolution. It is not, of course, either normal or beneficial for a Republic to depend on one man’s fortunes. Yet many are inclined to consider the situation, as described above, as fully fitting to the facts of Greek politics. That is why they believe that a gradual introduction of PASOK into government by means of coalition governments would, if not take the sting out of any hostile reaction, at least soften the impact and enable Greece to break away from the pattern of one-party governments which by staying so long in power make any alternative practically impossible.
Though it now seems unlikely that PASOK will manage to win a majority at the next elections, would it be wise for Mr. A. Papandreou to think of governing (or could he?) by alienating the conservative democratic parliamentary wing? Is it possible to govern and implement his socialist programme, as he claims, by a sheer parliamentary majority or would he manage alone to counterbalance or to prevent the formation of a reactionary front? There is also another possibility: that neither of the two big parties—the ruling New Democracy and PASOK—succeed in winning a clear parliamentary majority at the next elections.
Greek politicians must not repeat their mistakes of the 1950s and 1960s. When one party monopolises power for so long it tends to reinforce the tendency of the Right-wing to resort to State violence and abuse of civil rights, resulting in extreme political polarisation and open confrontation. Given the fragile nature of the Greek political institutions, lack of hegemonic ideology of the ruling classes and the State’s inherent inability to deal with the problem of political mass participation, a “de-stabilisation” process usually triggers off uncontrollable pressures. And, on the other hand, those opposition parties of socialist orientation, like PASOK, should learn the lesson of the 1960s by not trying to alienate those forces whose co-operation could prove vital to block any undemocratic reaction. But it seems that neither New Democracy nor PASOK will discuss openly what they intend to do in case the ballot box does not give them a clear majority for one-party government. Both are nervous as yet of being accused of a “behind the scenes” compromise.
Is it in the nature of a Communist Party to waste energy and thinking in what is supposed to be an “intra-bourgeois” conflict? From the very beginning KKEint. urged the other parties to work out a constructive approach to these problems by suggesting that coalition governments are not by definition bad. KKEint. argues that communists, socialists and other democrats should work together for promoting the formation of a government based on the broadest possible democratic forces, for neither French nor Italian examples fit the Greek case. Governmental crises could invite military intervention. Some recent unusually low-key reactions to various Government moves by other opposition parties show some signs of hope.
Foreign Policy
In the field of foreign policy KKEint. also differs considerably from other opposition parties. For example: on questions like Cyprus, the Greco-Turkish dispute on the Aegean and national sovereignty KKEint. is as resolutely nationalist as PASOK, but it does not share the latter’s blanket neutralism. While it holds the view that the withdrawal of Greece from NATO’s military structure must be made permanent, it does not advocate a complete severing of links with the West, pointing to the dangers of upsetting the strategic balance between the two Super Powers in the area. Italian Communists, fearing the implications of any “destabilisation” process both in Greece and Yugoslavia upon them, deeply appreciate this position.
EEC is a thorny problem for the Greek Left. KKEint. is the only opposition party to produce concrete political and economic arguments and studies on this issue, despite its limited resources. It supports the case of Greece’s accession but it is very critical about the terms of entry the Greek Government finally succeeded in agreeing with Brussels. From the point of view of political strategy KKEint. shares PCI’s conviction that the cause of socialism must be seen and fought in its European context. KKEint. is critical of both KKEext. and PASOK for not lifting a finger to initiate a mass movement for the protection of those interests that seem to be threatened by Greece’s terms of entry. Let us say that while KKEext. is totally against Greece’s accession. PASOK, having wandered for a while in searching for a “Mediterranean common market” favours now a special trade agreement with the EEC. Greece, as a small country on the capitalist periphery, has to face the dangers emanating from European monopolies, to economic directorate and bureaucracy of Brussels at the expense of its independent and autonomous national economic future—or so the argument goes.
KKEint.’s international relations with other Eurocommunist parties could be better. The French CP does not recognise KKEint. and deals exclusively with the Moscow-orientated KKEext. On the other hand, relations with the French Socialist Party are very good. The Italian CP recognises both parties but above all the “realities” of the Greek Communist movement by trying to influence the KKEext. policies on EEC and NATO. It is the Spanish Communist Party which has the most friendly and unreserved relations with the KKEint. It does not seem to me that Eurocommunist parties are making any serious effort to bring KKEint. into European and international forums, but this is a subjective impression. Some Eurocommunists might prefer a united CP in Greece with KKEint. playing the role of a loyal minority opposition—a sort of “ Fin- landisation ” of the Greek case. But this is quite fictional. There is no doubt also that relations with KKEint. must stir some additional friction between Eurocommunists and Moscow and this probably explains partly the very cautious approach that many of them display towards it. Relations with countries of “actually existing” socialism are also limited. KKEint. relations with Yugoslavia and Romania seem to be excellent though it is not clear to what extent they are translated in substantial support for the KKEint. People’s Republic of Korea is the only country recognising KKEint. as the sole representative of the Greek Communist movement. KKEint. condemned strongly both the Vietnam-led invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam as a matter of principle. So relations with Vietnam, which used to be very good, must now have ended.
Conclusion
Certain points are reasonably clear. The paths of each party to Eurocommunism are different, but the whole process displays some common features. Eurocommunist parties were able to be transformed slowly from within by tolerating dissent and minority opinion, by looking critically back on their past, by sailing with the winds of change, and above all by the willingness and ability of their leadership to make room for changes to be effected. In some ways we can say that old views and habits were superseded by new ideas and practices. In my view, it is a case of “change from above” facilitated both by a stratum within the parties already won over and to a certain extent by the habitual passivity and obedience of party members. We have seen that none of the above conditions was applicable to the Greek case.
The issue of dependence on the Soviet Union proved decisive in dividing the Greek Communist leadership. The Spanish CP in exile, after its defeat in a ferocious civil war, managed to win its independence; but it is doubtful whether Carrillo could have opened a new era for his party had he not been able to prepare the ground carefully and enlist the support of other prominent party leaders. The skills of leadership and a broader consensus at the top were also lacking in the Greek case.
It is impossible to examine seriously the developments within Eurocommunism while ignoring the national context of each individual party and the respective specific conditions for their evolution.
So has Eurocommunism really any future in Greece? That depends on many conditions. For the present KKEint. is compressed between PASOK and the Stalinist KKEext. It seems that it has to rely absolutely on its own forces. It has managed to survive and to overcome successive crises so far, and the formation of a hard core of devoted and determined members and supporters is evident. If in the long run it is able to overcome its shortcomings, build up its own resources, strengthen its own identity, reform itself further and redress the balance within the Communist Left, then it can constitute a major component of a Left alliance which could radically alter the prospects of Greek socialism. Many “ifs”. But the challenge is still there.
* The author is a postgraduate student, University of London.